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The purpose of this thesis is to show how l a b o r s
right to organize was affected by the legislation passed dur*ing
the New Deal period.
ment of this problem.

Chapter I examines the historical develop
Chapters II and III are devoted to a

careful analysis of the legislation, the philosophy behind it,
and the mechanics of its implimentation.

The remaining portion

of the thesis discusses the effectiveness of the legislation
during a decade of operation and the subsequent impact of court
interpretation.
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CHAPTER I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT
The history of the labor movement is long and complex
To trace briefly the history of the movement with all its
problems and intricacies would reveal nothing new or signifi
cant.

Consequently the historical background recorded in

this chapter will be confined to only the most significant
problems which have faced the American workingman in his
attempts at unionization.

These problems were, to be more

precise, the overcoming of legal and economic obstacles which
prevented the laboring man from organizing into trade unions
for the purpose of collective bargaining.

Historically bona

fide labor unions have been organized by men who wanted to j\
improve their working conditions, their pay, or otherwise
change their relationship with their employer through the
process of collective bargaining.

The history of the labor

movement has been a study of methods used by unions and the
attitudes that society has taken towards these methods as
reflected by statutory and common law.
Collective bargaining is not a new concept.

Simple

forms of it can be found very early in recorded history.

In

medieval England, town charters and merchant guilds provide
excellent examples.

The townspeople, through collective

contract, secured certain rights from the King.

For these

rights, they paid him a sum of money*

The most important of

these can be found in the doctrine ,TCity air makes free,”
which simply meant that if a serf resided in a city for a
year, he became a free man.

Xji thi^_^ay, freedom was secured

through collective bargaining.

Until freedom was obtained,

no one could make individual contracts.

Historically, then,

individual and collective bargaining have been interdepend
ent.^
The right to organize and bargain collectively has
been, impinged upon in many ways by government in the United
States.

Although the President has been the chief executor

of law passed by Congress, many governors and mayors had a
great deal of influence on public opinion and business in the
localities.
encourage it.

They could tolerate collective bargaining and
They held police power and the authority to

determine what was or was not peaceful.

Police could arrest

union members for inciting riot, disturbing the peace, or
obstructing traffic.

On the other hand, a friendly executive

could allow a great deal of freedom to the worker in his
union activities.
The courts were probably the most important branch
of government

so far as the law of collective bargaining was

^John R. Commons and John B. Andrews, Principles of
Labor Legislation (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers,
1936), p. 379.
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concerned.

Much of the law in this field was not formulated

by legislation, but was built by court decision or common law.
Even where a statutory law existed, the courts exerted great
discretion in their application and interpretation of that
law.

Statutes in this area were necessarily broad, and

general, hence it has actually been the courts1 interpre
tations which have decided whether the law encouraged collective bargaining or discouraged it.
For many years labor organizations were considered
conspiracies in restraint of trade, and therefore illegal.
This view naturally made it very nearly impossible to use the
collective bargaining process.

That was the first great

challenge which organized labor had to meet.

Labor organiza

tions which used collective bargaining were considered danger
ous because they exerted more power than individuals bargain
ing for themselves.

Collective bargaining also meant inter

ference with the free bargaining of individuals, both members
and nonmembers of the organization.
In order to thoroughly understand the problem, it
must be remembered that the doctrine of conspiracy had broad
application, and was not applicable to labor combinations
alone.

A conspiracy, generally defined, was the combination

of two or more persons who scheme to impair the rights of

2

.

Ibid., p. 377.

others or of society.

In this category would fall for example

the plot of a group of people who conspire to bring about the
conviction of an innocent person or a plot to overthrow an
established government.

Before conspiracy would be charged,

there had to be shown that the group had caused or would
cause an injustice to other people or to society.

An interest

ing characteristic of the conspiracy doctrine was that con
spirators could be indicted and found guilty before they had
committed the act.

For example, it was a crime to plot the

murder of a person even though the plan was not executed.
Another feature of importance about the doctrine was that an
action by one person, although legal, could become illegal
when carried out by a group.
when he said:

One judge stated it succinctly

"A combination of men is a very serious matter.

No man can stand up against a combination; he may success
fully defend himself against a single adversary, but when his
3

foes are combined and numerous, he must fall."
American courts in the early nineteenth century
placed great emphasis on the fact that labor organizations
were considered conspiracies, when taking action to increase
their wages, by the English courts.

The prosecution urged

that English law established a precedent for American courts.
In other w o r d s , the American courts should be bound by the

^People v. W i l z i g , 4 N. Y. Crim. 403 (1886).
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doctrines and laws of England.

It was conceded, however, that

workers had the right as individuals to take action to increase
their wages.

Individual bargaining for higher wages, even

individual quitting of work b e c a u s e d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with
working conditions, was legal.

The charge was that the com

bining of workers to force higher wages constituted illegal
conduct.^

This doctrine, however, made some sense in England

because they had a statute which set a wage limit; hence, when
a union tried to use concerted action to increase their wages,
they were technically trying to accomplish an illegal objec
tive.
The British view was adopted for the first time by
an American court in 1806 in the case of Commonwealth v.
Cordwainers.

In this case the defendants were charged with

the following counts:
Cl) The defendants, on the 1st day of November,
1805, with force and arms did combine, conspire,
and agree to increase and augment the prices and
rates usually paid and allowed to them... and
unjustly to exact and procure great sums of money
for their work and labor... to the damage, injury
and prejudice of the masters employing them...
(2) ... the defendants endeavored to prevent by
threats, menaces, and other unlawful means...

A

,

Fred Witney, Government and Collective Bargaining
(Chicago: J. B. Lippencott Company, 1951), p. 27.
^Commonwealth v. Cordwainers, Commonwealth v. Pullis
(1806), as reported in John R. Commons and Eugene A. Gilmore,
A Documentary History of American Industrial Society (New
York: Russell and Russell, 1958), V. 3, pp. 61-247.

other workmen and journeymen in their occupation
from working except at certain large prices, and
rates set by them for. their future work, to the
great damage and prejudice of others*., to the
evil example of others, and against the peace
and dignity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The judge, in his directions to the jury, backed the
prosecution charges but indicated that the verdict would not
impair the right of an individual to bargain with his employer,.
The jury found the defendants guilty as charged, and so for the
first time in America the doctrine of conspiracy was accepted
by an American court .
Other state courts made similar decisions.

During

the early decades of the Nineteenth Century, there were nine
teen cases (in the States of Connecticut, Maryland, Massachu
setts, New York, and Pennsylvania) in which workers1 organizations were prosecuted on such conspiracy charges.

One of
o

the best known cases of this type was the People v. Fisher.
In most of these cases, penalties, when assessed, were
in the form of fines although imprisonment w a s also provided
by law.

In passing sentence, the judge usually threatened the

more serious penalty for second offenders.

The effect w a s , of

course, to discourage union activities.

Elias Lieberman, Unions Before the Bar (New York:
Harper Brothers, 1950), p. 13.
7

Ibid., p. 15.

^People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 28 A m D 501.

The argument the employers used in condemning the
practice of organizing for the purpose of collective bargain
ing was classical in character.

Control of wages by unions,

it was argued, was an unnatural, artificial method of raising
the price of work beyond its natural level, and took advan
tage of the public.

It was contended that the increase of

wages by union pressure lead to higher prices of commodities.
This in turn resulted in reduction of demand for the products
causing unemployment in the community.

Therefore the effect

of the union pressure was to cause injury to the community,
damage commerce and trade, and harm the cause of all workers.
The first major concession to organized labor in the
United States came in 1842 in the case of Commonwealth v. Hunt.
In this case the Massachusetts court convicted seven members
of the Boston Journeymen Bootmakers * Society for organizing a
strike against an employer who had hired Jeremiah Horne, who
was not a member of the society.

This was in effect an attempt

by the workers to establish a closed shop.

The charge against

the seven members was one of conspiring together to prevent the
employer from pursuing his trade.

After hearing the case, the

trial judge instructed the jury that the indictment described
a course of conduct amounting to criminal conspiracy.

This

meant that if such acts were proven at the trial, a verdict of
guilty would have to follow.

The workers were convicted and

they appealed their case to the highest court in the State.

Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judi
cial Court overthrew the lower court ruling.

In his decision,,

Justice Shaw defined conspiracy as follows:
”A conspiracy is
^
a combination of two or more persons, by some concerted action,
.

to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accom
plish some purpose, not in itself unlawful, by criminal or
unlawful means.’1

Justice Shaw could find no statutes for

bidding the raising of wages so he held that there was no con
spiracy involved.

He also ruled that even a combination which

struck to maintain a closed shop was not illegal.^"0

This

decision has been referred to many times by liberal judges as
a precedent for holding that workers have the legal right to
combine into trade unions and to bargain collectively, even
for the closed shop, with the strike as their tool.

By the

middle of the Nineteenth Century, American courts had generally
abandoned the idea that workers were guilty of criminal con
spiracy merely because they combined and struck for higher
wages.

The decision in Commonwealth v. Hunt was one of the

most important in the evolution of union rights in the United
States.

In discussing this case, Charles Gregory said:

” ...

this decision, issued by perhaps the most able state judge of
his time, gave the doctrine of criminal conspiracy a consider
able setback. ..
o

Common law criminal conspiracy has never

Commonwealth v . H u n t , 4 Metcalf, 45, Mass. Ill (1842).

l0Ibid.

again played a prominent part in the control of labor unions
11
by Amerxcan courts.. .**
Another important development in the common law of
England was the doctrine of restraint of trade.

As in the

case of the doctrine of conspiracy, it also became a part of
the common law of the United States.

The origin of this

doctrine was found in the basic idea of common law that cer
tain types of contracts and agreements were illegal if they
tended to restrain trade or created a monopoly.

It was

thought unwise to allow parties to enter into contracts that
would prevent free competition.

This concept of restraint of

trade was not applied, however, to labor organizations until
after the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890.
The Sherman Act was exceedingly simple in statement.
The gist of the act appeared in its first two sections, which
read, in part, as follows:
Section 1. Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby de
clared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make
any such contract or engage in any such combina
tion or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor,...
Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize

^ C h a r l e s 0. Gregory. Labor and the Law (New York,
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1949), p. 29.

any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,.. .^-2
The federal courts were given the authority to enforce
this act, and the Attorney General was empowered to initiate
criminal prosecutions or to secure injunctive relief against
violations.

All persons injured by violations of others were

allowed to press civil suits for triple damages against those
who violated the act.
Although the two sedtions quoted above appear to be
quite simple and exact, the subsequent problem of court inter
pretation of the phrases ,T...in restraint of commerce...,n
and ,f...to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce,” did
not substantiate this assumption.

Justice Holmes was said to

have thought those two sections so general in their coverage
that they amounted to little more than a congressional direc
tion to the federal courts nto do right" by the consuming
public in protecting it from big enterprise.

13

One of the most heated controversies of that time was ^
whether or not Congress intended the Sherman Act to cover the
activities of organized labor.

After all, the courts at one

time had treated labor unions as restraints of trade.

The

•^ United States Statutes at L a r g e , 51st Congress,
Session 1, May 16, 1890.
13
Gregory, o p . e x t ., p p . 201-2.

11

courts themselves, however, had by 1890 come to accept labor
unionism as an established social institution and had practically ceased to regard the purely bargaining functions of
unions as restraints of trade.

In the key sections of the

act there was no mention of labor unions.

But just as impor

tant was the fact that the act did not specifically exclude
unions.

The question was whether the words "combination" or

"person" referred to unions as well as to business enter
prises.

Much has been written on this controversy.

evidence to support both arguments.

14

There is

In any event, at the

time of its passage few people thought that it applied to
15
labor unions . and for the first eighteen years the act was
in force it was not applied to them.

3.6

Shortly after the passage of the act, however, lower
courts applied it to labor disputes; by 1900 the American
Federation of Labor sought legislation,

exempting unions from

..
.
17
its provisions.

14

Edward Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1930).
A. T. Mason, Organized Labor and the Law (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1925). Professor Berman concluded that
Congress did not intend to inelude labor unions within the
scope of the legislation while Professor Mason held the oppo
site opinion.
15
Commons and Andrews , jop. c i t ., p. 385.
^Gregory, o p . c i t ., p. 206.
17

.

Commons and Andrews, op. cit*, p. 385.
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The first case involving labor and the Sherman Act to
reach the Supreme Court was the famous Danbury Hatters* case
of 1908*

A nationally affiliated union of hat workers was

attempting to organize all the workers of the eighty or more
large felt hat manufacturers in the nation.
already orgaa ized.

Most of them were

A few manufacturers were strong enough to

resist the union and this proved to be quite embarrassing to
the union because the non-union plants were able to sell their
products at a lower price due to the lower wages paid to their
employees.

The 'union was unsuccessful in attempting to organ

ize Loew*s Hat Company by local strikes in Danbury, Connecti
cut*

As a result of this failure, the union imposed a nation

wide secondary boycott on the company.

All members of the

American Federation of Labor were urged to stop buying these
hats and to stop patronizing shops thich sold them.

Loew’s

suffered substantial losses, and under the appropriate provi
sion of the Sherman Act brought civil suit against the
individual membership of the union for triple damages and
secured a judgment of over a quarter million dollars.

The

case was appealed to the Supreme Court which sustained the
lower court *s decision.
It was the opinion of the court that the act "pro
hibited any combination whatever to secure action that
■j Q

Loew v. Lawlor, 208 TJ. .S.

(1908).

13
essentially obstructed the free flow of commerce among the
states or restricted the liberty of an individual to engage
in business.M

19

The court also pointed out that the combi

nation was in that class of restraints of trade which was
illegal under common law.
The Danbury Hatters doctrine had serious effects on
the labor union movement.

The case stimulated additional

prosecution of labor unions under the Sherman Law.

Since the

Supreme Court held that the law applied to unions, employers
were endowed with a potent weapon with which to combat trade
unions.

In addition, the decision established the principle

that individual members are responsible for actions of their
officers.

Justice Holmes, who wrote the opinion of the court,

declared that since "members paid their dues and continued to
delegate authority to their officers unlawfully to interfere
with the plaintiffs* interstate commerce in such circumstances
that they knew or ought to have known, and such officers were
in the belief that they were acting in the matters within
their delegated authority, then such members were jointly
liable...*'

20

The practical significance of this decision was

that the rank and file members as well as the union officers
were liable for the payment of the judgment.

19 Ibid.
2®Lawlor v. Loew, 235 U. S. 522 (1915).

14

The Danbury Hatters decision also had the effect of
outlawing the secondary boycott since it was this activity by
the union which caused the suit*

This was a serious loss of

power for organized labor at a time when they could ill afford
it*

Placing unions under the antitrust laws, making the indi

vidual union member responsible for damages, outlawing the use
of the secondary boycott, all had the effect of drastically
weakening union power.
In conjunction with the doctrine of restraint of
commerce was the use of the injunction.

An injunction is a

judicial order commanding a person or persons not to do a par
ticular thing.
of property.

21

It was designed primarily for the protection
In the 1880*s the use of it against labor organ

izations was established and almost any employer opposing any
action by a labor union was able to secure an injunction or a
temporary restraining order.

22

Unless the organization or

persons wanted to pay contempt fines, they were obliged to
obey the order.

The injunction placed the labor unions in a

unique position for, as Felix Frankfurter wrote:
In labor cases, the injunction cannot preserve
the so-called status quo. The situation does not
remain in an equilibrium, awaiting judgment upon
full knowledge. The suspension of activities
affects only the strikers; the employer resumes
his efforts to defeat the strike and resumes them,

21

Edwin E. Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1932X7 p. 33.

22

Gregory, op. c i t ., pp. 99-101.

15

free from the interdicted interferences. More
over, the suspension of the strike activities,
even temporarily, may defeat the strike for
practical purposes, and foredoom its resumption,
even if the injunction is later lifted.23
The injunction was found to be quite an effective
device by many employers; all that was necessary to initiate
an order was an affidavit swearing that the strike, boycott,
or other action being used by the labor organization would
result in irreparable damage to property*

24

In many cases,

this could not be objected to, if, for instance, there had
been actual physical damage done to the plant or building,
such as windows broken or doors smashed.

But many employers

claimed and many judges agreed that property was more than
this.

They claimed the word "property” implied the right to

carry on business without interference; in some cases this
would rule out the primary boycott, the secondary boycott,
and picketing.
All judges did not take this view on property.
Oliver Wendell Holmes said:
By calling business property, you make it
seem like land.... A n established business, no
doubt, may have pecuniary value and commonly is
protected by law against various unjustified

23

George P. Shultz and John R. Coleman, Labor Problems,
Cases and Readings (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1953),
p . 366
^ G r e g o r y , o £ . cit . , p . 97.

injuries.
But you cannot give it definitive
ness of contour by calling it a thing.
It is
a course of conduct and like other conduct, is
subject to substantial modification, according
to time and circumstance, both in itself and in
regard to what shall justify doing it a harm. 5
The injunction was also used to enforce the so-called
nyellow dog” contracts which many employers forced prospective
employees to sign.

In the contract was the promise not to

join a particular union or perhaps any union whatsoever*
These contracts had little legal significance because at that
time an employer could discharge any employee for any reason,
hence it was used for its psychological effect.

The courts

also held that such contracts could be used as ground to
Issue sweeping injunctions against any kind of "persuasion”
of workers to join unions.

The legal reasoning was that

"persuasion” under such circumstances was inducing the worker
to break a contract, and this action was a legal wrong against
which the employer was entitled to injunctive relief.
reasoning was upheld by the Supreme Court.

This

26

So far, only legal questions have been considered, but
actually of more importance than the legal barricades obstruct
ing the employee from exercising his right to organize was the
intangible economic weapons held and used by the employer.

2^Ibid., p. 98.
Hltchman Coal and Coke Co., v. MitcheJLl, 2

229 (1917).

U. S.

17

The employer had certain rights that were used to thwart
labor organizations and which were upheld by law prior to the
enactment of the New Deal labor legislation.

The rights of

employers in dealing with their employees were as follows:
(1>
ciations.

Employers had the right to form employers’ assoThis was unquestioned in the courts.

27

Individual

employers could refuse to make trade agreements with unions
and through their organizations they could make legally bind
ing agreements to operate under an open shop plan.

They were

able to bind themselves with penalties not to deal with labor
unions, and such penalties were enforceable at law and through
i n j u nctions.^

In addition to this, it was held by the West

Virginia State Courts that unions could not combine to prevent
29
employers from belonging to employers * associations.
(2) In addition, employers had the right to ,Tlock
out” their employees; this right was considered the counter
part of the strike and was not questioned by the courts.
(3)

The right of the employer to operate his plant

during a strike was also unquestioned as was his right to
police protection.

In some states, the law required, however,

that in advertising for labor during a strike, the strike had

07

Commons and Andrews, oj>. c i t . , p. 403

28Ibi d ., p . 404

29Ibid.

to be mentioned.

To protect the strike breakers, the

employers might hire strike guards.

Thus did the employer

not only have the right to defeat strikes but to defeat
organizational strikes which prevented the growth of labor
organizations among their employees.
(4)

One of the most effective and most frequently

used methods of preventing organization was the right of the
employer to discriminate against union workers.

He could

refuse to hire a union member or even a former member and he
could discriminate against him in any number of ways such as
work arrangements or pay adjustments.

Legislation to restrict

the employer from discharging a worker for joining a union was
passed in eight states by the turn of the century (Illinois,
Kansas, O h i o , Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Indiana, Missouri,
and Wisconsin), but in at least six of these states the laws
were declared unconstitutional.

32

In 1898 Congress attempted

to limit this right as it applied to the railroad workers
when it passed the Erdman Act, but this too was declared
unconstitutional because it was in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.

The Supreme Court stated:

...the right of a person to sell his labor upon
such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence,
the same as the right of the purchaser of labor
31

Ibid.

^^Ibid., p. 405

to prescribe the conditions upon which he will
accept such labor from the person offering to
sell it. So the right of the employee to quit
the service of the employer, for whatever reason,
is the same as the right of the employer, for
whatever reason, to dispense with the services
of the employee...
(5)

Since the employers absolute right to dismiss

an employee was not denied, the result was the virtual
legalization of the black list.

Although most states had

laws which outlawed the circulation of lists of union members
it was not illegal to act on such information by refusing to
hire an individual.

The employer's reason for refusing to

employ or for discharging an employee could not be questioned
34

in any court.

In actual practice, it was almost impossible

to enforce these laws since supplying of such information by
former employers upon request of a potential or present
employee was considered privileged at law; consequently, if
the employee was discharged as a result of this information,
he had no legal recourse unless the employer who discharged
him would divulge his source of information.

The latter, of

course, did not occur.
(6)

It was also considered the undisputed right of

the employer to organize company unions.

A company union is

one which was organized and run by the employer and was found

33Adair v. U. S., 208 U. 5. 161 (1908).
34
Commons and Andrews, op. c i t ., p. 408.

20

to be an effective way of preventing the growth of a trade
union.

A company dominated, union or an employee representa

tive plan by its very nature cannot be a successful collec
tive bargaining unit because of the influence which is brought
to bear by the employer.

Nevertheless, company dominated

unions grew very rapidly in the decade following the first
World War, and this type of organization proved to be a suc
cessful method of slowing down the organization of trade
unions.
Therefore there were three main problems facing the
labor unions in the first decade of this century.

The first

was the continued use of the anti-trust acts against them for
restraint of trade, as exemplified in the Danbury Hatters
Case; the second was the use of the injunction, which included
the rigid interpretation of the word-"property;” and the third
was the economic coercion used by the employers.
The American Federation of Labor considered it impera
tive to seek legislative relief from such restrictions.

Pro

tection of the right to organize, to bargain collectively, to
strike, to boycott, and to picket had become a vital concern.
The first step in attempting to exert more effective political
pressure in support of such aims were made in 1906 when the
American Federation of Labor submitted a bill of grievances to
the President and to Congress.

Two of the most important de

mands were for exemption of labor unions from the Sherman Act

21

and relief from injunctions which were said to represent a
judicial use of power properly belonging to the legislature.
Congress ignored 'labor’s appeal, and the bills that
the unions tried to introduce were pushed aside.

When the

American Federation of Labor consequently entered actively
into the congressional campaign of 1906, it not only called
for the support of all congressional candidates favorable to
labor, but where neither party had named a favorable candi
date, it recommended the nomination of a trade unionist.

Two

years later, in 1908, Gompers called upon both party conven
tions for support.

While the Republicans completely ignored

the appeal, the Democrats adopted an anti-injunction plank in
their platform.

Nothing was accomplished in this area for

the next six years, although the Democratic House chosen in
1910 gave hope of a more favorable attitude towards labor.
An effective eight hour day for workers on public contracts
was finally passed, an Industrial Relations Coaimission was
established, and provisions were made for the creation of a
Department of Labor designed to promote the workers1 welfare.
But it was not until the election of 1912 that a real turning
point was reached so far as significant labor legislation was
concerned.
In President W i l s o n ’s inaugural address, he emphasized
the need for legislation which would safeguard the workers'
lives, improve their working conditions, and provide them
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“freedom to act in their own interest.”

He denied that such

laws could be considered class legislation and claimed that
they were in the interest of the whole people.
The results of Wilson*s program were quite substan
tial.

He won legislative support for the La Follette Seamen’s

Act in 1915, which corrected some of the glaring abuses in the
employment of sailors.

The Adamson Act established an eight-

hour day, with time and a half for overtime, for all employees
of railways.

More controversial, although desired by labor,

was the Congressional enactment of a literacy test for all
European immigrants which was the first step toward the policy
of immigration restriction long demanded by labor.

Desirable

as this legislation w a s , labor longed for more, and in 1914
Congress finally passed the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, including
within it too sections which labor believed to be relief from
the Sherman Act and the injunction.
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To labor, this more

than fulfilled the Democratic promise of 1912 which stated
that ’’labor organizations and their members should not be
regarded as illegal organizations in restraint of trade.

37
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Documents of American History, ed. Henry Steele
Commager (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, I n c ., 1949),
pp. 262-3.
^ F o s t e r Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company), pp. 197-207.
37
Survey, July 4, 1914, Vol. 32, p. 360.
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Specifically, Section 6 of the Clayton Act declared
that f,the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce," and that nothing in the anti-trust laws should
be construed to forbid the existence of unions, preventing
them from "lawfully" carrying out their legitimate objects,
or hold them "to be illegal combinations," or "conspiracies
in restraint of trade.""5®
Section 20 outlawed the use of injunctions in all
disputes between employers and employees "unless necessary to
prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property
right... for which injury there is no adequate remedy at
law."
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This appeared to free labor from the injunction when

engaging in such activities as strikes, the secondary boycott,
and picketing.^
Organized labor felt it had won a victory.

Samuel

Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor and
chief spokesman for labor, referred to the act as "the indus
trial Magna Charta upon which the working people will rear
41
their construction of industrial freedom."

^®United States Statutes at Large, 63rd Congress,
Session I, May 30, 1914.

^ G r ego ry , b £ . c i t ., p . 163
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If Gorapers was over-optimistic, there were others who
foresaw the weaknesses of the law.

In an editorial in The

Nation, it was observed:
Labor unions may not be enjoined from lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects therof
That leaves the whole question undecided, or
rather, throws it back to the courts, with their
previous decisions as to what may and may not be
done lawfully*42
The weakening of Sections 6 and 20 was attained by the
Supreme Court decision in the case of Duplex Printing Press
Company v. Peering which was finally decided in 1921 after
almost six years of litigation in the courts . ^
In this case, an international mechanics* union had
attempted to unionize a non-union printing press company,
the only company in the industry which was not organized.

The

pressure used by the union was not the strike but the secon
dary boycott--members of the union refusing to repair or to
work on this company’s presses where they were installed or
to work for anyone who used them.
The Duplex Company in a suit for injunctive relief
under the Sherman Act sought to stop this organized pressure.
The union relied on Section 20 of the Clayton Act as a defense,
arguing that its terms covered this situation.

The Supreme

^ T h e Nation, October 15, 1914, V. 99, pp. 456-7.
43
. .
Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering, 254 U. S
443 (1921).
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Court ruled that Section 20 applied only in cases where the
relationship of employment existed between the company and the
union members involved.

In other words, the secondary boycott

was not legalized and so the injunction could be used*
By pointing out the frequency of use by Congress of
the words "lawfully" and "peaceably," the court said that it
was the intent of Congress to carry on the old interpretations
of the court as to what was peaceful and legal.

The courts,

however, had proved to have a very narrow view concerning the
activities of labor.

As an example, in several cases the

courts had ruled that there was no such thing as "peaceful"
picketing; that is to say, they had declared the very act of
picketing to be i l l e g a l . ^

Another example of the narrow view

that the courts took toward labor activities was the inter
pretation which made the secondary boycott, picketing, and
certain strikes illegal because they were interfering with the
"property rights" of business.
The net result of the Duplex case was that the Supreme
Court through its interpretation placed the whole question of
what was "peaceful" or "lawful" activity of labor back into
the hands of the courts.

The courts, basing their new de

cisions on the old interpretations of what was "peaceful" or
"lawful" could still use the injunction.

AA

,■

Gregory, o p . c i t ., p. 165.

The activities,
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which were presumably made legal in Section 6, were not legal
if the court in some previous decision ruled that they were
not.

The only conclusion which can be drawn, after a close

examination of the decision, is that the Clayton Act did not
change the law affecting labor unions or their activities in
any appreciable w a y .
A number of later United States Supreme Court
decisions completed the destruction of the Clayton Act.

For

example, in the American Steel Foundaries v. Tri-City Central
Trades Council case, the court handed down a rigid definition
of peaceful picketing.

This definition was not thought fair

by labor unions who branded this type of picketing "Pink Tea
Picketing."
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In the case of Truax v. Corrigan, any hope of legal
relief for labor was even more effectively killed.

Arizona

had passed a law that sought to do away altogether with injunc
tions in labor disputes, and the Supreme Court in effect de
clared it unconstitutional.

By preventing an employer from

obtaining an injunction, it was stated, the State took away
his means of securing protection and thereby "deprived him of
property without due process of law."

46

With such encouragement from the courts, employers
resorted to injunctions even more frequently than in the days

45I b i d .. p. 172.
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Truax v. Corrigan, 257, U. S. 312 (1921).
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before the passage of the Clayton Act.

In 1928, the American

Federation of Labor submitted a list of 389 injunctions that
had been granted by either Federal or State courts in the pre
ceding decade, and this list was incomplete because of a large
47
number that were not recorded in the lower courts.
In 1932, just before the advent of the New Deal, the
Norris-La Guardia Bill was passed.
several reasons.

This act was important for

First of all, the encouragement of collec

tive bargaining was made a public policy of the Federal Govern
ment.

It stated that:

.

W h e r e a s , under prevailing economic conditions,
developed with the aid of governmental authority,
for owners of property to organize in the corporate
and other forms of ownership association, the indi
vidual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to
exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect
his freedom of labor, and therby obtain acceptable
terms and conditions of employment, wherefore,
although he should be free to decline to associate
with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full
freedom of association, self organization, and
designation of representatives of his own choosing
to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment,
and that he should be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or
their agents, in the designation of such representa
tives or in self-organizations or in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection...48
No machinery was provided, however, to prevent employ
ers from interfering with this right, but it was a beginning.

^ G r e g o r y , o£. cit., p. 174.
48
Unxted States Statutes at Large, 72nd Congress,
Session I, June 1, 1932.
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It also greatly limited the use of the injunction and in
reality did away with the ."yellow-dog*1 contract by making it
49

non-enjoinable in the courts.
Congress had as early as 1898 attempted to regulate
the use of this kind of contract when it enacted the Erdman
Act.

This act confined itself to the railroad industry, which

was considered within the legitimate jurisdiction of the
Federal government because of its interstate character, long
before any other.

The purpose of this law was to promote

interstate commerce.

In accomplishing this purpose, pro

cedures were to be established designated to reduce labor con
flict in theination’s railroads.

Though the law provided for

the mediation and arbitration of labor disputes, the concern
here is with its provisions which protected the rights of
railroad workers to organize and bargain collectively.

The

Erman Act in part resulted from the famous Pullman strike of
1894.

Fundamentally this strike was caused by the refusal of

the Pullman Company to respect the right of workers to bargain
collectively.

Congress was aware that organization strikes

could again interrupt railroad traffic among the states.

Such

strikes could, result from the demand by the railroads that
workers live up to "yellow dog" contracts, and the discharge
of workers because of union activities.

49

Congress reasoned

Commons and Andrews, op. c i t ., p. 421.
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that if these two anti-union practices could be eliminated
the necessity for organizational strikes in the railroad
industry would be reduced.

As a;result of these considera

tions, Section 10 was included which stated that it was a
misdemeanor for railroad employers to require employees to
sign a rryellow dog" contract or to discharge or threaten to
discharge an employee for joining a union.
The Erdman Act suffered a fatal blow from the Supreme
Court in 1908.

The court found this provision of the Erdman

Act to be unconstitutional as an invasion of both personal
liberty and the rights of property.

50

A comparable state law

was outlawed in the case of Coppage v. Kansas in 1915.51
T h u s , the third of a century preceeding the advent of
the New Deal was a period in which a number of ineffectual
steps were taken by the government in an effort to help labor
achieve an equal bargaining position to that of industry.

The

Clayton Act attempted to free organized labor from the injunc
tion and the anti-trust laws.

Because of the conservative

nature of the Supreme Court, this failed.

The Erdman Act was

designed to free railway employees from the fear of losing
their jobs because of union affiliation and this also failed,
due to the interpretation of the courts.

50
Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908).
^ C o p p a g e v. Kans a s , 236 U . S .

1 (1915).
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The only hopeful sign subsequent to the New Deal was
the passage of the Norris-La Guardia Act which limited the
use of the injunction against labor unions and in effect did
away with the "yellow dog" contract.

Thus upon the dawn of

the New Deal, organized labor still had a number of problems
to solve.

The most pressing of these was the employers use

of his economic power to hire, fire, organize company unions,
and coerce his employees.

These were the problems that

Congress would have to solve in the decade of the New Deal.

CHAPTER II
NEW DEAL LEGISLATION
By the time Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933
it was apparent that the labor movement was not satisfied with
the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act.

While grateful

for the progress made by the act, labor felt additional legis
lation was needed.

During the next three years, Congress

enacted three pieces of legislation which largely satisfied
the demands of organized labor.

This legislation included

Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Public
Resolution Number 44, and the National Labor Relations Act.
Organized labor felt that legislation in addition to
the Norris-La Guardia Act was needed because of two fundamental
problems.

The first was most easily understood; there was a

surplus of workers as unemployment was at an all time high.
The law of supply and demand made it clear that it was an
employer's market.

If an employee agitated for organization

of a union or if he was a union member, any action taken by
his union could endanger his job.

Secondly, many employers

promoted company unions when they feared the danger of a trade
union movement within their own company.

The company union

differed from the bonafide trade union in that it was dominated
by the employer who often wrote its constitution or by-laws,
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attended its meetings, and paid its expenses.

Although, the

growth of the company union was rapid during this period, its
origin was much earlier.
In 1918, the National War Labor Board was created to
act in labor management controversies which might interfere
with war production.

This Board was an agency of voluntary

conciliation and arbitration without coercive powers other than
the force that its opinion might have on public opinion.

The

War Labor Conference Board, upon whose recommendation the
National War Labor Board was established, had previously indi
cated that the work of the National War Labor Board should be
based on two principles;

(1) that the working man should have

the right to organize and bargain collectively, and (2) that
employers had the duty to refrain from interfering with trade
unions or find a suitable substitute measure.
union became this substitute.

The company

The National War Labor Board,

however, promptly condemned the use of a company union as a
device to avoid the duty of genuine collective bargaining, aid
in a series of rulings asserted labor's right to be free of
such a hindrance, by issuing an official governmental state
ment of sympathy with laborfs right to bargain collectively.
The Board sai d :
The right of workers to organize in trade
unions and to bargain collectively through chosen
representatives Is recognized.and affirmed.
The
right shall not be denied, abridged, or interfered
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with by the employers in any maneuver what
soever....
Employers should not discharge workers
for membership in trade, unions nor for legitimate
trade union acitivties.
With the close of World War I, governmental interest
in this problem faded.

Although the company union declined in

some quarters, it flourished in others.

Employers, realizing

that the habit of organization was a force with which they
must deal, extended the use of the company union.

It was esti

mated that while in 1919 only 403,765 workers were members of
company unions, by the year 1922 the number had increased to
690,000.

By 1926 the membership had grown to more than two
2
million wage earners.
Employers often positively refused to recognize and
deal with bonafide trade unions, and utilized the company
union to divert any organizational drive.

An example of this

is seen in an incident which occurred in the Ames Baldwin
Wyoming Company in West Virginia in September, 1933, when
several employees attempted to organize a union.
had requested recognition and seniority rights.

The union
On June 25,

1934, the power in the plant was discontinued, and all employ
ees were required to attend a meeting called by the president

Bureau of Labor Statistics, National War Labor Board,
Bulletin 2 8 7 , (1922).
2
American Federation of Labor, Report of Proceedings
of the Forty-Sixth Annual Convention, (1926), p. 290.

34

of the company, Richard Harte.

Harte stated that under law

he could not recognize unions that did not represent 100 per
cent of the employees, and would not recognize them in any
event.

He set forth the following alternatives to union

recognition;

(1) shut down the plant, (2) tear down the plant,

or (3) move away.

He pointed out the benefits provided by

company unions, and requested that a vote be taken to indicate
whether the workers were for or against the company plan.

The

men voted with little or no secrecy, and a company official
counted the ballots.

The exact tabulation was not announced;

however, a statement was issued stating that the company plan
had attracted eighty per cent of the vote.

Consequently, the

constitution which had been written by company lawyers was
considered ratified by this vote, although no opportunity to
vote on its acceptance or rejection had been given.

In addi

tion, the constitution made the union a close shop plan.5

As

in many cases when a company union had been organized, sub
stantial wage increases were given, exemplifying the idea that
the company union could accomplish what other trade unions
4
could not.

Committee on Labor and Education, Hearings on National
Labor Relations Board, United States Senate, 74th Congress,
First Session, part 1, p. 170.
4Ibifl., p. 167.
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Xn 1919 the National Association of Manufacturers gave
its official endorsement to company unionism in a statement
that read in part:
The widening movement for the open shop is
stimulated by the extension of plans for indus
trial representation which are being rapidly
introduced not only in manufacturing establish
ments, but in other industrial organizations.
A firm foothold has been obtained by the indus
trial representation idea.
If plans for its
adoption are wisely introduced, representation
should become the most approved method of deal
ing with labor.5
Organized labor, however, objected to the use of

\

company u n i o n s , and were united in their belief that it was \
not an instrument of collective bargaining, but rather of

\

compromise and conciliation at best and merely represented

\

a method of company domination of workers.

In 1919 the

—

American Federation of Labor condemned the company union in
the following terms:
In establishing w a g e s , hours, and working con
ditions in their plant, employers habitually used
their great economic power to enforce their will.
Therefore, to secure just treatment, the only
recourse of the workers is to develop a power
equally strong and to confront their employers
with it....
In this vital respect, the company
union is a complete failure. With hardly a pre
tense of organization, unaffiliated with other
groups of workers in the same industry, destitute

National Association of Manufacturers, Proceedings
of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention, (1921) , p. 21.

of funds, and unfitted to use the strike weapon,
it is totally unable to force its will...,6
The company union was not the only method used by
business to thwart the development of bonafide unions.

Cer

tain economic weapons used in conjunction with propaganda
techniques proved to be quite effective.

Certain of the more

sophisticated industries used what was later called "The
Mohawk Valley Formula.11

This formula became so effective in

breaking organizational strikes that it was circulated to the
members of the National Association of Manufacturers.

Though

used for years in more or less complete form, it was not cir
culated until after 1936.

The formula was written by James

H. Rand, 'Jr., President of Remington Rand.

He utilized it

successfully to defeat attempts of organization in his plant
in 1936.

After the plant broke a strike in the Ilion, New

York, plant of Remington Rand, Mr. Rand boasted:

"Two million

business men have been looking for a formula like this and
business has hoped for, dreamed o f , and prayed for such an
7
'
example...."
Although the plan was not invented by Mr. Rand,
he certainly formulized, popularized, and published it.

^American Federation of Labor, Report of Proceedings,
Thirty-Ninth Annual Convention, (1919), p. 303.
7
Decisions and Orders of the National Labor Relations
Board, Vol. XI, p. 664.

This formula blueprinted a systematic campaign to de
nounce all union organizers as dangerous agitators, align the
community in support of employers in the name of law and order
intimidate strikers by mobilizing the local police to break up
meetings, instigate " b a c k to work1’ movements by secretly organ
izing "loyal employees," and set up vigilance committees for
protection in getting a plant on strike in operation again.
The underlying purpose behind the Mohawk Valley Formula was to
win public support by branding union leaders as subversive and
threatening to remove the affected industry from the community
if local business interests stood by and allowed radical agi
tators to win control over workers otherwise ready and anxious
to cooperate with their employers*

The formula indicates the

cynicism shown by some employers in their efforts to discour
age labor organization.

It also gives a clearer picture of
8
what the unions faced in their organizational attempts.
Almost every New Deal attempt at recovery had one com
mon theme to increase the purchasing power of the people.

The

New Deal aimed to promote economic recovery by bolstering the
demand for goods.

Public works were instituted and, in keeping

with the objectives of increasing purchasing power, these pro
jects were financed by government borrowing.

An important

part of this scheme was the increase of workers' wages.

o
See Appendix.

If
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wages could be increased, workers would have more money to
spend.

Increase of spending would stimulate employment and,

in turn, promote economic recovery *
These New Deal principles were contained in the Nation
al Industrial Recovery Act.

The law provided for the regula

tion of production and prices by groups of business men.

The

theory underlying the National Industrial Recovery Act was
that such control would provide a balance in the economy.
Business men in the various industries formed groups for the
purpose of production and price control.
then create a "code of fair competition."

The group would
About 550 of these

codes were created during the era of the National Industrial
Recovery Act.

These codes provided for industrial self-

government by business men.

Production and prices were not

to be controlled by the law of supply and demand but through
regulations adopted by members of the respective industrial
groups.

Since such an arrangement was in violation of the

anti-trust laws, the National Industrial Recovery Act pro
vided that these statutes were not applicable to participants
in these industrial groups.

Congress required that every code

contain two provisions regarding labor.

The first was that

every code was required to establish a minimum wage for the
workers it covered.

This was in keeping with the New Deal

desire to increase the purchasing power.

The second was that

Section 7 (a) be included in each and every code.
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Section 7 (a) provided legal protection for the right
of workers to organize and bargain collectively.

No doubt

one reason for Section 7 (a) was the desire of Congress to
correct the obvious injustices of the law of labor relations.
On the other hand, the economic motive of Section 7 (a) cannot
be disregarded.

Legal protection of collective bargaining

meant stronger unions from the point of view of membership
and power.

This would mean greater effectiveness in pressure

for higher wages.

Thus, a strong organized labor movement

would serve the basic theory of the New Deal to promote recovery through increasing the purchasing power of the nation.
Section 7 (a) drew in large part its basic principles
and language from the Railway Labor Act of 1926, except that
while the Railway Labor Act confined itself to one basic
industry which had been considered for some time within the
legitimate jurisdiction of the Federal government because of
its interstate character, Section 7 (a) was much more inclu
sive in its scope.

The Railway Labor Act was also much more

precise in its enforcement provisions and proved to be a much
more effective piece of legislation when viewed from the pri
vileged position of hindsight.

9

Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 19^9T7"p* 266.
^ United States Statutes at L a r g e , Sixty-Ninth Congress,
Session I, May 20, 1926.
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Three significant provisions were found in Section
7 (a):
Cl)

Employees should have the right to organize and

bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, free from interference, restraint, or coercion on
the part of their employers;
(2)

No one seeking employment should be required to

join a company union or to refrain from joining any labor
organization of his own choosing; and
(3)

Employers should comply with maximum h o urs,

minimum rates of pay, and other conditions of employment
approved by the President of the United States . ^

On June 16,

1933, President Roosevelt signed the bill saying:
The law I have just signed was passed to put
people back to w o r k , ... W o r k e r s ... are here
given a new character of rights long sought and
hitherto denied.
But they know that the first
move expected by the nation is a great coopera
tion of all employers, by one single mass-action,
to improve the case of workers on a scale never
attempted in any nation.
Labor boards were created to adjust industrial disputes
arising from the provisions of the act.

Some were established

by the codes of fair competition, such as the National Bitumi13
nous Coal Labor Board and the Newspaper Industrial Board.
•^I b i d .; Seventy-Third Congress, S e s s i o n ! , June 16,1933.
^ T h e Public Papers a n d .Addresses of Franklin D. Roose
velt (New York: Random House, 1938), Volume II, p. 251.
13
Ludwig Teller, Labor Disputes andCollective Bargain
ing (New York: Baker and Voorhis and Company, 1940) Volume II,
Section 241, p. 680.
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Other boards, brought about by executive order of the Presi
dent, included the Automobile Labor Board and the National
Steel Labor Relations Board.

14

Most important, however, was

the National Labor Board created on August 10, 1933, by exec
utive order number 6246.

President Roosevelt appointed the

following men to sit on the Board:

Senator Robert Wagner was

appointed Chairman and William Green, Dr. Leo Wolrnan, John
L. Lewis, Walter C. Teagle, Gerard Swope, and Louis Kirstein
were the regular members.
This Board was established to promptly settle any
labor disputes arising out of Section 7 (a).

President

Roosevelt explained the need for such an agency as follows:
Soon after the enactment of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, it became apparent that
some agency would have to be set up to handle
the labor disputes which were continually arising
under the various codes.... In order to meet
that need, I appointed the first National Labor
Board.... The function of the Board was to con
sider, adjust, and settle differences and contro
versies that might arise through differing inter
pretations of the labor provisions of the codes....
The Board soon found it necessary to expand its
activities, in order to take care of the large
number of disputes which were arising under
Section 7 (a)....^5
The Board established twenty regional boa r d s .

Each

consisted of representatives of labor and industry, with
representatives of the public as impartial chairmen to adjust

14Ibid.
Roosevelt, op, c i t ., S'. 109, pp. 318-19.
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eases and hold hearings in the regions where the controver
sies arose-

Consequently, cases could be expedited and the

parties involved could avoid the necessities of going to
Washington -^
The National Labor Board was strengthened by an execu
tive order on December 16, 1933.

In explaining what this order

intended to do, President Roosevelt said:
The foregoing Order was issued by me, to streng
then the hand of the National Labor Board, which
I had appointed on August 5, 1933.
There had been
several flagrant cases of defiance of the Board
by large employers of labor.
The foregoing Order
gave the Board the right to adjust all industrial
disputes... and to compose all conflicts threaten
ing the industrial peace of the country . ^
Subsequent executive orders issued on February 1, 1934, and
February 23, 1934, (Executive Orders Number 6580 and 6612)
approved all previous orders of the Board and gave it author
ity to hold elections to determine employees* choice of repre
sentatives for the purpose of collective bargaining, and to
publish the names of the elected representatives.

18

The Board

was further authorized to present its findings of violations
of' Section 7 (a) to the Attorney General’s office for action.
The only action possible under the law, however, was the rernoval of the ’’Blue Eagle” from the offending employer.

16I b i d .

17Ibid., pp. 524-25.

18Ibid., p. 781.

19Ibid.

19

This
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penalty carried some weight since the Federal government did
not do any business with industries not displaying the ’’Blue
Eagle” and asked the public to follow its example.

This prac

tice had been followed since President Roosevelt had issued
Executive Order Number 6246 on August 10, 1933.

20

Section 7 (a> contained many basic defects.

There was

no provision for enforcement; it failed to specify which anti
union activities were illegal, and company dominated unions
were not expressly declared illegal nor were employers re
quired to bargain collectively with freely chosen representa
tives of their employees.

It further failed to forbid discri

mination against employees for union activities.

The National

Labor Board had evolved into an agency which tended to concil
iate and arbitrate disputes because it had no clear-cut power
to enforce the spirit of Section 7 (a ) .

This was a tragic

turn of events since the National Labor Board was quite sucessful in its early attempts to protect the right of the workers
to bargain collectively.

A good example of this occurred al

most immediately after the Board’s creation.

It intervened in

a bitter hosiery strike in Berks County, Pennsylvania.

More

than ten thousand workers were involved in this strike and
every hosiery mill in the country was shut down.

^ I b i d . / Section 109 , pp . 318-19 .
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The National Labor Board settled the strike on the
basis of a procedure that became known as the "Reading Form
ula."

This formula provided that:

(1) The strike was to be

called off; (2) the striking workers were to be reinstated
without prejudice or discrimination; (3) an election was to
be held under the supervision of the National Labor Board to
designate representation for collective bargaining; and (4>
representatives chosen in such elections were to be author
ized to negotiate with employers with a view to executing
agreements concerning wages, hours, and working conditions.
In all but eight out of forty-five mills the workers chose
the hosiery workers* union as their collective bargaining
representatives.

After the elections were h e l d , a large num

ber of mill operators first refused to negotiate contracts
with the union representatives.

The National Labor Board

ordered these employers to negotiate and eventually almost
every firm complied.

21

The success of the Board in the hosiery industry was
repeated in other industries.

On the basis of the "Reading

Formula," the Board peacefully settled disputes involving
hundreds of thousands of workers in the wool, silk, clothing,

21

National Recovery Administration, Release Number 285,
August 11, 1933.
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street railways, arid machine shop industries.

22

.
The high

point in the Board's career was in November, 1933.

On Novem

ber 22 and 23, the Board conducted the most extensive elections
of its career involving 14,000 coal miners.

A special study

of the National Labor Board stated that for a time **... it
seemed that, thanks to the Board*s application of 7 (a), an
ideal of industrial democracy was in the process of realization in the field of industrial relations.

23

By the end of

the year, however, it was apparent that the National Labor
Board could not offer adequate protection to the right of
workers to self-organization and collective bargaining.
A series of events operated to weaken the prestige
and operating ability of the Board.

The first blow was de

livered by the Weirton Steel Company and the Budd Manufactur
ing Company.

Neither company would abide by the principle of

the **Reading Formula.**

Stubbornly refusing to allow their

workers collective bargaining rights, the corporations refused
to permit elections to be held to determine the question of
union representation.

Despite Board protests, the Weirton

Company held an election in which workers merely voted to
designate representatives to the company union.

22

Lewis L. Lorwin and Arthur Wubnig, Labor Relations
Boards (New York: Brookings Institution, 1935), p. 166.
23Ibid., p. 102.
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By February, 1934, mainly as a result of the failure
to settle the Weirton and Budd disputes with the "Reading
Formula," the national Labor Board was on the verge of col
lapse.

Many employers had followed the example of Weirton

and Budd.

Orders of the Board were ignored and its authority

was disregarded.

Because of the ineffectiveness of the Board,

the frequency of organizational strikes sharply increased.
Workers were determined to organize their,own labor unions.
As the National Labor Board could not protect them against
anti-union employers, employees resorted to the strike to gain
their objectives.

24

At this point President Roosevelt tried

to extend the Board's effectiveness by his executive order
granting the Board the additional powers to hold elections and
to recommend to the Attorney General’s office that the "Blue
Eagle" be taken away from the non-operating companies.

25

Once again it appeared the Board might function effi
ciently, but this view appeared short-lived.
the President seemed clear.

The intent of

He had given the Board an addi

tional measure of power and status.
the "Reading Formula” on its own.

The Board had developed
Almost immediately after

the February executive orders, employers challenged the
"majority principle" laid down by the President in his

24
25

Ibid., pp. 104-105.
See page 44, note 21.
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directive regarding free elections.. Employers claimed that
this principle would deny non-union workers of their employ
ment rights since the Board held that an employer had to bar
gain with the majority selected labor unions exclusively.
Since the employers had not previously shown such a great con
cern for the rights of the employee, the conclusion might be
drawn that this was simply another method of escaping the
obligation to bargain collectively.

Obviously, collective

bargaining could not be carried on effectively if employers
were free to bargain with individual employees.

If such were

the case, an anti-union employer would find it easy to under
mine the union.

In spite of this, Hugh Johnson and Donald R.

Richberg, the two chief executives of the National Recovery
Administration, shared the employers* view.

This also proved

to be a serious blow to the Board, and promoted confusion in
the National Labor Board Policy.
Finally, on May 29, 1934, the Judiciary dealt the
Board a fatal blow.

A district court refused to order the

Weirton Steel Company to permit a representational election
which would allow their employees to select a union of their
choice.

It is little wonder, that after such a ruling, employ

ers and employees alike treated the Board with contempt.
Because of the basic weakness of the law, Senator
Hagner introduced a bill, in an effort to rectify these defects,

which became known as the Wagner-Labor Disputes Bill.

Be 

cause it was jointly sponsored by Senator Wagner of New York
and Congressman Connery of Massachusetts, it was sometimes
called the Wagner-Connery Bill.

The bill was introduced in

February of 193l|> and hearings on the bill lasted through the
winter.

When it finally reached the floor of the House and

the Senate, it was debated at length.

Several amendments were

suggested but because of the highly controversial nature of
the bill and the time element involved, Congress felt that they
would be unable to reach an agreement on the law before ad
journment.

Congress believed, however, that some kind of

action was necessary, and in the place of the Labor Disputes
27
Bill passed Public Resolution Number l|ij. on June 19, 193^*
The purpose of the Resolution was to provide for the
interpretation and enforcement of Section 7 (&)•

The National

Labor Relations Board was created and given the statutory
power to hold representational elections and to investigate
violations of Section 7 (a).

The only difference between the

powers of this new Board and the old National Labor Board was
that these two powers were derived from Statutory Law rather
than Executive Order.

20
27

Unfortunately, the new Board suffered

Congressional Record, Vol. 7Q,- Part 1|, p. 3Wk3«

United States Statutes at L a rge, 73rd Congress,
Session 2, June 19, 193U-
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from the same defects that proved fatal to the National Labor
B o a r d ; that i s , it did not have the power to enforce its own
orders.

Enforcement depended upon the action of the Compli-

ance Division of the National Recovery Administration or the
Department of Justice.

In addition, employer anti-union prac

tices supposedly outlawed by Section 7 (a) were not spelled
out in the Resolution.

This meant that the National Labor

Relations Board would have to formulate its own principles
and the question of enforcement methods were as vague as be
fore.
Vagueness as to the scope of authority of the National
Labor Relations Board and divisions of responsibility for the
enforcement of its decisions constituted the two main obstacles
to the effective operation of the agency.
respect its orders.

Employers did not

Although the National Recovery Admini

stration did order the removal of the nBlue Eagleft from firms
which ignored Board decisions, this technique of enforcement
proved to be unsatisfactory.

Consumers did not care whether

or not a company possessed a ,TBlue Eagle.”
The Department of Justice did not provide adequate
enforcement.

The Board referred thirty-three cases to the

Department; of these only one injunction was sought for
enforcement purposes.

Sixteen cases were sent back to the

Board for lack of evidence.

In three cases, the Department

overruled the Board and held that no suit was justified.
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In the remaining cases, the Department for one reason or
another refused to enforce orders of the Board.

28

On May 27, 1935, the United States Supreme Court de
clared the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional
in the famous Schechter case.

This decision, considered by

many to be one of the most significant court decisions during
the New Deal period, stated that Congress had delegated legis
lative power to the President in an illegal manner.

In the

majority opinion, the Court said that the National Industrial
Recovery Act was unconstitutional:
...insofar as it purports to confer upon the
President the authority to adopt and make effec
tive codes of fair competition and impose the
same upon members of each industry for which
such a code is approved, it is void because of
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.29
Such
of the

a decision outlawed Section 7 (a) along with the remainder
National Industrial Recovery Act.

It made Public Reso

lution Number 44 meaningless since the resolution was merely
created to carry out the provisions of Section 7 (a).

It was

apparent that new legislation was needed to fill the void
created by the decision of the courts.

^ D . 0. Bov/man, Public Control of Labor Relations
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1942), p. 45.
29

Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States,
295 U. S. ^95 (1935).
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Even before the Supreme Court had made its decision
in the Schechter case, however, it was clear that Section 7 (a)
and Public Resolution Number 44 were not fulfilling their
purpose.

Senator Wagner summed it up in a radio speech on

April 21, 1935, as follows:
The virtual collapse of Section 7 (a) is a
matter of common knowledge, the cause for this
has been that a relatively small number of un
fair employers have discriminated against and
discharged employees who have exercised their
fundamental rights; have set up a masquerade
type of union which is really the creature of
the employer rather than the representative of
the employee, and have taken advantage of the
lack of adequate enforcement power behind
Section 7 (a)....30
As pointed out previously, the basic philosophy of
Section 7 (a) and Public Resolution Number 44 was to promote
the organization of unions for the purpose of collective
bargaining and to stamp out the organization strikes that
were so prevalent in the country at that time.

The New Deal

promoters of this legislation also felt that, as a result,
workers would be in a position to demand a fair share of pro
duction, thereby eliminating the cause of the existing and
future depressions.

Failure to accomplish these objectives

was evident upon examination of some of the Labor Department
statistics.

30

From 1927 to 1931, there were on an average

Congressional Record, Vol. 79, Part 6, p. 6184.

763 strikes per year, involving 275,000 strikers and costing
5,665,000 labor work d a y s .

In 1933 more than 812,137 workers

were out on strike, and in 1934 the number rose to 1,277,344,
Forty-six per cent of all strikes in 1934 were caused by
organizational disputes.

31

Seventy-five per cent of the cases

brought before the National Labor Relations Board involved the
same type of dispute.

32

Failure to aid in establishing industrial peace existed
by reason of many weaknesses in this legislation.

The National

Labor Relations Board established under Public Resolution
Number 44 had the power to hear disputes arising out of Sec
tion 7 (a) and then order an election to be held.

The

employer, however, could appeal the case before any such elec
tion could take place, thereby postponing any swift decisions
by the Board.

In reviewing cases wherein a company objected

to such an election, any action taken by the court could be
delayed for almost a year.

The National Labor Relations Board

lacked the power to investigate except in connection with an
election.

It was not given the quasi-judicial power needed to

interpret the law and to hand down binding decisions.

It was

unwise to tie Section 7 (a) to the industrial codes because
this did not involve all workers who dealt in interstate

"^ M onthly Labor Review, Vol. 42, p. 162.

xo

»

United States Senate Report Number 5 7 3 , 74th Congress
1st Session, pp. l-*2.

53
commerce.

Both of the laws were ambiguous.

They were inter

preted in different ways by the administrators of the law.
For example, Hugh Johnson, who headed the National Industrial
Recovery Administration, believed that Section 7 (a) did not
mean that the majority of the workers could elect a represen
tative to speak for all of the workers.

In other words, he

recognized the concept of proportional representation.

Theo

retically, it would then be possible for an employer to deal
with several organizations separately, making different agreements with each of them.

33

On the other hand, as Lloyd

Garrison, Dean of the University of Wisconsin School of Law,
pointed out, the National Labor Relations Board in several
cases accepted the principle of majority r u l e . ^

Another

inherent weakness was the inability of the National Labor
Relations Board to enforce its decisions.

As Senator Wagner

stated during a Senate debate:
The present National Labor Relations Board
has not been vested with enforcement powers...
It is the administration rather than the Board
which exercises final discretion in determining
whether the ”Blue Eagle” shall be removed or
_
whether government contracts shall be cancelled. 5

3'’i b i d . , p. 5.
3 ^Hearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee
on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 74th Congress,
1st Session, Part 2 , p. 127.

■35'
Congressional Record, Vol. 79, Part 7, p. 7568.
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The National Labor Relations Board could investigate and make
recommendations to the National Industrial Recovery Admini
stration, but any final action rested with the latter.
Many of the disputes did not pass directly to the
National Labor Relations Board for hearing.

Instead, they

were delegated to one of the many conciliatory boards which
had been established by law or executive order through the
years.

There were, at one time, as many as fifteen of these

conciliatory boards established to handle problems within a
particular industry.

Senator Wagner argued that this merely

resulted in confusion as to jurisdiction and ultimately ended
in conflicting decisions.

He described these industrial

boards as follows:
Partisan in composition, living in an atmos
phere of compromise and conciliation, they are
well designed to adjust wages and hear contro
versies... but they are not suitable for enforc
ing the provisions of 7 (a).5 ?
The greatest weakness of this existing legislation,
however, was its inability to prevent an employer from creating
a union

or organization which

company

union.

he could dominate; jl. ^e., the

Section 7 (a>stated:

No employee and no one seeking employment shall
be required,as a condition of employment, to join

3 6Ibid.,
3 7 Ibid.

p. 7569.
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any company union or to refrain from joining,
organizing, or assisting a labor union of his
choosing .2 8
However, neither Section 7 ( a )

nor Public Resolution Number

44 gave the National Labor Relations Board or any other agency
the power to prevent employers from ignoring this directive.
Neither did it provide for any penalties for failure to comply
with this law.

In these cases, the Board was powerless to

initiate any effective action against an employer.

At best,

it could merely recommend that the "Blue Eagle” be taken away.
Because of the inability to prevent employer domination of
unions, the fundamental purpose of this legislation was
defeated.

William Green, President of the American Federation

of Labor, in testifying before the Senate Education and Labor
Committee, pointed out that:
Of the company unions on which we have reports,
only eighteen per cent were formed prior to the
National Industrial Recovery Act; sixteen per cent
of the total were not started until an attempt was
made by the employees to form a bonafide labor
union.
The plan originated directly with an
officer of the company in fourteen per cent of
the cases, and in fifty-one per cent, the organ
izers were paid by the company.29
In all cases involving company unions heard before the old
National Labor Board, the constitution or by-laws were written

^ U n i t e d States Statutes at Large, Session 1, June 16.
■-.. .... — — — — ----------- *
V
^ Hearings on National Labor Relations B o a r d , Committee
on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 74th Congress,
1st Session, Part 1, p. 110.
i955m
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by the employer or his lawyers.
organized t h e m . ^

The company financed and

Prime examples were the Firestone Tire and

Rubber Company, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, and Goodrich
Tire and Rubber C o m p a n y . ^

When complaints were lodged against

these companies for ignoring Section 7 (a), the National Labor
Relations Board ordered that elections be held.

In all

instances the companies appealed these decisions to the c o u r t s . ^
This method then served the purpose of postponing an election
and gave the employer the opportunity to further the cause of
the company union.

|

In many instances, companies hired full-time organiza
tional staffs to come into their plants and convince their
employees that a company union was to their advantage.

Fire

stone hired ninety-two men for this purpose, B. F. Goodrich

I

hired one hundred fifty men for the same reason, and Goodyear
/ *2

hired sixty men.

Not once was there any suggestion by a wit

ness testifying before the Congressional committee investiga
ting this problem that the provisions outlawing the company
union was in any way effective.
On the other hand, this early legislation, though basi
cally ineffective, had some positive results.

Immediately

following the passage of Section 7 (a), the membership in unions

4°ibid., p. in.

4 ^-Ibid.

4^Ibid .

4 5 I b i d ..

p. 1 1 2 .
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was encouraged,

William Green announced in 1933 that the

American Federation of Labor had increased its membership by
1,300,000 as a result of the National Industrial Recovery
Act.^*

Xt also ended legislative antipathy to the "yellow

dog” contract, being more effective than the Norris-La Guardia
Act in prohibiting execution of such a contract .^5
The experience of this early legislation emphasized
the care needed in drafting labor legislation.

Litigation

resulting from carelessly phrased sections of Section 7 (a)
was extensive in both Federal and State courts.

No sooner

had the National Industrial Recovery Act and state acts pat
terned after the same entered the statute books than the
courts advanced the theory that strikes, picketing, and boy
cotts were thereby outlawed.

In one case a New Jersey court

held that in view of the acts, "strikes are forbidden by the
public policy of nation and s t a t e s . . S i n c e

the acts pro

vided for the mediation of disputes, this made resorting to
such mediation a necessary prerequisite to engage in any form
of labor activity for the enforcement of any demand.

^ N e w York Times , October 2, 1933 , p . 1.
^ T e l l e r , op. c i t ., Vol. 1, p. 662.
^ E l k i n d v. Retail Cler k s T International Protective
Association, 114 N. J. eq. 586, 169 A 494, 1933.
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A New Jersey court held this to be true.

47

It was also sug

gested by some that the National Industrial Recovery Act outlawed National labor unions,
lower court was reversed.

48

but on appeal this view of the

49

The only conclusion that can be drawn from this early
New Deal experimentation in labor legislation is that it failed
in making any basic change in the collective bargaining process
before the Schechter decision had been announced.

When the

Supreme Court did render a decision on the National Industrial
Recovery Act, it emphasized this failure and pointed up the
need for new legislation to replace what had been nullified.
Senator W a g n e r ’s leadership in this field continued and his
role in subsequent legislation was significant.

47 Lichtman v. Leather Workers Industrial Union, 114
N. J. Eq. 596, 169 a 498, 1933.
^ B a y o n n e Textile Corporation v . American Federation
of Silk Workers, 114 N. J., Eq. 307, 168 A 799, 1933.
49116 N. J. Eq. 146, 172 A 551, 92 ALR 1450, 1934.

CHAPTER III
THE WAGNER ACT
Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act
had failed before the Supreme Court declared the act unconsti
tutional.

This was clearly indicated when Senator Wagner

introduced the Labor Disputes Bill the previous year.

When

this bill failed to pass and Public Resolution Number 44 was
passed as a substitute, Senator Wagner and his followers were
dissatisfied and, consequently, early in the 1935 Congressional
session, a new bill was introduced which was basically the same
as the rejected Labor Disputes Bill.

Senator Wagner was not

only instrumental in drafting this new bill, but played a deci
sive role in steering it through it through Congress..
The fact that in the decades following the passage of
the Wagner Act a close political alliance has grown up between
the Democratic Party and labor, plus the lasting importance of
the act which was passed at the height of the New Deal period,
has left the general impression in the public mind that the act
was a key piece of New Deal legislation and that Roosevelt was
instrumental in securing its enactment.

In fact, there is

adequate evidence that Roosevelt himself was never greatly
interested in the subject and gave his support only at the
last minute.

Frances Perkins, who was President Roosevelt’s

Secretary of Labor throughout his term of office, has said of
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the President’s relationship to the Wagner Act:
It ought to be on record that the President
did not take part in developing the National
Labor Relations Act and, in fact, was hardly
consulted about it.
It was not a part of the
President’s program.
It did not particularly
appeal to him when it was described to him.
All of the credit for it belongs to Wagner.^
Raymond Moley, at that time still a member in good
standing of Roosevelt’s Brain Trust, substantiates Secretary
Perkins* appraisal.

He went further and explained Roosevelt’s

last-minute adoption of the act on the grounds that the
President ’’needed the influence and votes of Wagner on so many
pieces of legislation and partly because of the invalidation
of the National Industrial Recovery Act.”
Secretary Perkins, herself, did not play a significant
role in the drafting of the act.

When she appeared before the

Senate Committee on Education and Labor, she addressed herself
to only one problem; that was whether the Board should be a
part of the Labor Department or become an independent agency.
She was quite mild in her expressions but stated that she felt
■ 3
the Board should be a part of her department.
All in all,

1

Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Know (New York: Viking
Press, 1946), p. 239.
2

Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1939), p. 304.
^Hearings on National Labor Relations B o a r d , Committee
on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 74th Congress,
1st Session, Part 1, p. 65.
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it was strikingly evident upon examination of the hearings that
administration spokesmen played a very minor role in the whole
proceeding.

It should be said for Roosevelt, however, that

when he finally gave his support to the legislation, he was
not swayed by industry pressure to change his position.
After May 27, 1935, the date the Schechter decision
was handed down, the legislative pace quickened.

Senator

Wagner was extremely anxious for speedy passage of his bill.
House and Senate hearings on the measure were intensified, for
the members of these committees were well aware that with the
destruction of Section 7 (&), the collective bargaining ques
tion had been set back three full years.

It was apparent that

industrial peace could not be established in the absence of a
law which would effectively establish the collective bargain
ing process.
Stimulating Congress was the powerful voice of organ
ized labor channeled through the American Federation of Labor.
The campaign which it conducted was vigorous and unceasing.
Organized labor had tasted and enjoyed the fruits of a national
protective legislative program.

Section 7 (&), despite its

shortcomings, served to whet the appetite of organized labor
for a truly effective labor law.

Labor leaders were aware of

the tremendous benefits that the union movement would acquire
from an adequate law protecting the right of the worker to
self-organize and bargain collectively.

Mass meetings were
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held to urge the passage of the bill.-

Organized labor made

crystal clear the character of its future program.

It threat

ened to work for the defeat of each and every senator or rep
resentative who opposed the law.

Senator Wagner was even more

vigorous in his activities on behalf of his bill than ever
before
Convinced that the previous legislation had been a
failure, and that this indicated a crucial need for his bill,
he stated in April of 1 9 3 5 •
Thus the American battle for industrial liberty
has been waged upon the issue whether workers
shall be free to associate together if that Is
their desire.
The first great victory was won
when, after seven years of frustration, Congress
passed the Norris-La Guardi a Act.
But the ela
tion of the friends of freedom was short-lived.
Devious devices were used to defeat the objec
tive of the Act.
Even without the ’yellow d o g ’
contract the unfair employer could discharge and
discriminate against workers if they violated
any'dictate of his will.
As a remedy, the famous
Section 7 (a) was passed, forbidding any interfer
ence with the right of workers to organize for
purposes of mutual advancement....
The virtual
collapse of Section 7 (a) is a matter of common
knowledge.
The curse of this has been that a
relatively small number of unfair employers have
discriminated against and discharged employees
who exercised their fundamental rights; have set
up a masquerade type of union which is really
the creature of the employer rather than the rep
resentative of the employee, and have taken advanenforcement power

^Congressional Record, Vol. 7 9 j Part 6, p. 6 1 8 I4.
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Support of the bill by the general public appeared
obvious, if one could gauge by the subsequent congressional
vote in favor of it.

The press, however, was definitely not

universal in its acceptance of the bill.

Although such maga

zines as the New Republic, Literary Digest, and Nation came
out in favor of the bill, many other magazines and newspapers
opposed it.

An example of favorable commentary on the bill

was an editorial in The Nation which said in part:
The most important provision of the
to the heart of the present difficulty
it proposes an independent labor board
exclusive and definite authority..„ to
pret and enforce^the laws dealing with
tive bargaining.*'

Bill goes
in that
with
inter
collec

An editorial in the New York Times noted that this bill was
unfair and biased in favor of labor.^
Various religious groups announced their approve.! of
the bill.

The Right Reverend Monseigneur John A. Ryan, Direc

tor of the Social Action Department of the National Catholic
Welfare Conference, sent a statement to Congress endorsing
the bill, as did Rabbi Sidney E. Goldstein, Chairman of the
Social Science Justice Commission, Central Conference of
American Rabbis.

Rabbi Goldstein said:

The history of labor in America and in other
countries proved that the workers can advance
t.
Editorial in The Nation, March 6 , 1935*
6

.
Editorial in the New York Times, May 23, 1935*
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their own welfare only to the degree that they
acquire power to bargain collectively through
organization of forces• In this economic crisis
it is more necessary than ever to protect and
preserve the rights of labor to organize and to
direct its own destiny.7
The statement of policy which was contained in Section
1 of the National Labor Relations Act revealed a dual objec
tive.

The first was to promote industrial peace by encourag

ing and directing collective bargaining.

The second was to

equalize bargaining power between employers and employees by
removing restraints upon the right of employees to organize.
To accomplish this dual objective, the act provided for two
distinct types of proceedings.

The first defined certain

activities engaged in by employers as "unfair labor practices"
and prohibited the employers from engaging in them.

The

second contained provisions for setting up the machinery where
by representatives of employees could be designated for the
purpose of bargaining collectively.
The act provided for a three-member board which had the
power to authorize rules and regulations necessary for carrying
out provisions of the act.

The Board would be appointed for a

five year term by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate.
year.

Each member would receive a salary of $10,000 a

The Board was not empowered to engage in conciliation,

^Congressional Record, Vol. 79, Part 7, p. 7680.
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mediation, or arbitration.

The Board was given the additional

power of moving to the scene of its inquiry, and subpoenaing
records needed for its investigation.

8

Section 7, which was probably the heart of the act,
provided that employees should have the right to self-organi
zation.

The right to form, join, or assist labor organizations,

to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining was also asserted.
The act set forth five unfair labor practices which,
if committed by an employer, subjected him to certain sanctions
contained in the act.

These five unfair labor practices were:

( 1 ) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the act;
(2 ) to dominate or to interfere with the formation or admini
stration of any labor organization or to give financial aid
or other support to it, except that the employer might allow
his employee to meet with him during working hours without
loss of time or pay, subject to the B o a r d ’s rules and regula
tions; (3> to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization, by discrimination in regard to the hiring or
firing of his employees, or any other condition of employment;

8
United States Statutes at L a r g e , 74th Congress,
Session 1, July 16, 1935.
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(It was provided that the employer could enter into a closed
shop agreement with a labor organization if the labor organi
zation was the proper representative of the employees, and the
organization was not a company dominated union) ; (4) to dis
charge or otherwise disriminate against an employee because he
had filed charges or given testimony under the act; (5) to
refuse to bargain collectively with the proper representatives
of his employees.^

It should be borne in mind that the unfair

labor practices were limited to those found in Section S.
act was specific in its terms.

The

Neither the Board nor the courts

could prohibit any practices which they thought were unfair;
only those listed in Section 8 could be considered illegal prac
tices.

The Senate Committee on Education and Labor said in its

report:

nThese unfair labor practices are supported by wealth

of precedent in prior Federal l a w . T h e
listed as examples:

following may be

The Railway Labor Act of 1926, The Norris-

La Guardia Act, and the 1933 Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act.
It is apparent upon close examination of the unfair
labor practices that determination of the proper bargaining
representative of employees was important under the act for

9 I bid,

Hearings on National Labor Relations B o a r d , Committee
on Education and La^or, United St a tes S e n a t e 7 4 t h Congress,
1st Session, Part 2, p. 8.
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two reasons.

The first was to determine the validity of

closed shop agreements entered into under Section 8 ( 3 } of the
act.

The law did not make closed shop agreements illegal;

however, it did not encourage them either.

While it allowed

unions to negotiate such an agreement if it was legally permis
sible to do so in the state, the act did prevent the negotia
tion of the closed shop if the negotiating agency did not live
up to the provisions of the l a w . T h i s

was to prevent the

company dominated union from securing a closed shop agreement.
The second reason was that it fastened on the employer the
obligation to bargain collectively as directed in Section 8 (5)
of the act.

This section made it an unfair labor practice for

an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with his employees
or their representatives.

A n agreement did not have to be

reached, however, but a bonafide effort had to be attempted.

12

'What this actually meant was the Board would have to determine
whether the employer was making a genuine effort or not.

An

employer by simply sitting down at a table and saying "nothing
doing" was not fulfilling his obligations; he had to show good
faith by offering a proposal, and willingly accepting counter
proposals for study.

Evidence of an inflexible attitude indi

cated bad faith. ^

U IMd.,
.

I3 Ibid.

p. 12.
*

1 2 Xbid.
'
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Xf there was any doubt as to which union, of several
claiming unions, was the majority union suited to represent
the workers, the National Labor Relations Board had the power
to hold an election.

The winner was then certified as the

union which properly represented all of the workers in that
particular unit for purposes of collective bargaining.

In

this way the act endorsed the principle of majority rule.
The question of whether or not majority rule was to be pro
moted in the act was hotly contested in hearings before the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor.

Every witness

appearing in favor of the act made it quite clear that the
principle of majority rule was necessary if the act was to
work.

It was pointed out that one of the main weaknesses of

Section 7 (a) was the interpretation made by Hugh Johnson
allowing proportional representation.

Charlton Ogburn,

appearing for the American Federation of Labor, insisted that
in order to give unions an equal bargaining position it was
imperative to accept the concept of majority rule.

In point

ing out what he considered to be the evils of proportional
representation, Mr. Ogburn said:

"Rival groups of workers

stimulated into jealousies and bitterness can never present a
united front.

That is why employers are so solicitous of the

right of the minority to be represented."^
^ H e a r i n g s on National Labor Relations B o a r d , Committee
on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 74th Congress
1st Session, p. 151.
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Appearing in opposition to the act, Walter Harnischfeger of the National Association of Manufacturers, said that
he opposed the concept of majority representation "because it
deprives the minority... of their freedom of action in matters
15
of bargaining."
In defense* of the act, the Senate Committee
explained:

"... the majority cannot make an agreement more

beneficial to them than to the minority or non-members of the
union."

The committee also pointed out that when the major

ity made a contract it applied to everyone in the unit; that
only an organization which was constructed for the purpose of
17
collective bargaining could bargain for all.
The act did
preserve the right of the individual employees or groups of
employees to present grievances to their employer and, as the
committee pointed out, the National War Labor Board under the
Railway Labor Act had established a precedent for the principle
18
of majority rule.
If there was a question as to which union of several
claiming unions represented the appropriate bargaining unit,
the Board was given the power to select the appropriate unit
and an election would be held to determine if the majority of

15

Hearings on National Labor Relations B o a r d , Committee
on Education and Labor, Report to Accompany Bill, United States
Senate, 74th Congress, 1st Session, p. 239.
I b i d ., p. 13
1 8 Ibid.,

p. 126.

1 7 Ibid.,

pp. 15-14.

70
the workers within the selected unit favored the union*

If^

they did, the employer was expected to bargain with the rep
resentative of that unit.

Thereby Congress gave to the

National Labor Relations Board broad discretionary authority
in determining whether a union should represent an employer
unit, a craft unit, a plant unit, or a subdivision thereof.
This was patterned after Section 2 of the 1934 Amendment to
the Railway Labor Act and was vigorously objected to by the
employer groups on the

grounds that it would give the Board

the power to favor one

union as opposed to another.

It was

feared that the Board would favor the unions affiliated with
the American Federation of Labor over unions organized on
the company level.

Congressman Rich of Pennsylvania, an

opponent of the bill, reasoned:
The Wagner Act will work in the interest of
only a small minority of workers represented by
professional labor leaders, will promote indus
trial strife, will bring about epidemic of labor
disputes... will in practice tend to make a
closed shop of every plant and to make every
employee carry a union card if he is to earn a
living .3-9
"At the time all labor leaders appeared to favor this
section of the act.

It was possible that at some future date

one American Federation of Labor union might find itself
pitted against another in a National Labor Relations Board

^ Congressional Record, Vol. 79, Part 9, pp. 9690-1.

71

election, but if this occurred it was reasonable to suppose
that the government would take the position that the question
of which union should compete for votes was a matter for
internal union deci-sion.
the Board later took.

This was in fact the position that

In the summer of 193& the Board was

asked to conduct an election in which two American Federation
of Labor unions were rivals.

The Board declined, pointing out

that this was in essence a jurisdictional dispute which, ought
to be settled by the American Federation of Labor itself.

A

different question came up in 1 9 3 7 5 however, when the National
Labor Relations Board was requested to intervene in a dispute
involving the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the
American Federation of Labor.

This time the Board did inter

vene on the ground that there was no apparent body to which
20
the question could be referred.
Thereafter the Board found
itself plagued with cases in which the American Federation of
Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations were cont ending parti es.
Congress gave the Board adequate power to stop unfair
labor practices.

Section 10 of the act authorized the Board,

after determining that one had committed an unfair labor prac
tice, to issue cease and desist orders.

They could then take

Archibald Cox and John T. Dunlop, tfRegulations of
Collective Bargaining b y the National Labor Relations Board,"
Harvard Law Review, vol. 6 3 , (1950), p. 3 8 9 .
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other affirmative action including reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay.

The issuance of such an order had

to be preceeded by the service of a complaint with a notice
of hearing and the person complained of was given the right
to answer to the charge.

A hearing was then held before the

Board or agent of the Board and, in the event compliance with
the BoardTs orders was not secured, then the Board was author
ized to apply to a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for enforce
ment of the order.

The aggrieved party could appeal the deci

sion of the Board to the Circuit Court of Appeals.

It is

important to note that an appeal to the Court by the aggrieved
party did not stop the order of the Board from being enforced.
This was insisted upon because under Section 7 (a) the courts
were used by employers as a means of delaying action.
The Board was given the power of subpoena in Section 11
of the act with authority to apply to any Federal District
Court for enforcement.

In the event of failure to obey a sub

poena , contempt proceedings could be brought to bear on the
offending party.

Willful interference with a Board member or

its representative or agents was criminally punishable.
The act contained two so-called limitations.
first preserved the right to strike.
a separability clause.

The

The second provided for

This meant that if one section of the

act were to be held unconstitutional, the other sections would
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not be affected.

This has proved to be of no importance in

view of the fact that the act has been held constitutional in
its e n t i r e t y . ^
Three basic principles can be found in the act.

The

first was employee self-organization unrestrained by employer
interference coupled with acceptance in good faith by the
employer of the practice of collective bargaining.

As a

result of this first principle, it may be said that the pur
pose of the act was to encourage labor organization.

The

second principle was that of majority representation, while
the third was a remedial principle involving prompt admini
strative machinery for enforcement of the provisions of the
act in preference to criminal penalties.

The procedure adop

ted in this act was patterned after the Federal Trade Commis
sion Act*
The National Labor Relations Act was viewed in many
quarters as a kind of emergency legislation which was highly
distasteful, and as a result bitter opposition sprang up
against it.

The reasons for hostilities to the act must be

understood in the light of the legal and constitutional back
ground against which it was passed.
it was a serious break with the past.

There is no doubt that
While it claimed merely

21
A complete discussion of the constitutionality of
the act can be found in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
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to confer upon labor the right to self-organization and the

Y

choice of representatives for the purpose of collective bar-

\

gaining, and appeared upon first glance to be an innocuous
restatement of Federal Judicial and Statutory Law, the provi
sions of the act went much further.

One important feature of

the act was its recognition for the first time in Federal
labor legislative history of a social interest in labor organi
zation.

This was the underlying theory of the unfair labor

practices declared by the act.

Employers were forbidden to

dominate, restrain, or interfere with labor organizations

/

engaged in self-organization because such self-organization /
and the resulting collective bargaining was to such a social
good as to make unlawful any interference with its development.
Many of the unfair practices listed in the act had been
for years considered legal and legitimate rights of the
employer.

Even though a similar act had been passed previously

in the form of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, this was restric
ted to a public utility which has long been considered a proper
reason for limitations upon labor's rights and employers * pri
vileges .
It was also a new concept to impose upon the employer
the duty to bargain in good faith with the employees' repre
sentatives.

The law prior to the enactment of the National

Labor Relations Act was stated in Hunt v. Simonds in the fol
lowing way:

’’It is obviously the right of every citizen to
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deal or refuse to deal with any other citizen and no person
has ever thought himself entitled to complain in a Court of
22
Justice of a refusal to deal with h i m .11
There were many additional reasons for the hostilities
towards the act.

It was another example of the extension of

the power of the Executive Department.

It was one more admini

strative board added to what appeared to be an ever-increasing
number of boards and bureaus.

It regulated business enterprise.

Both the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade
Commission met with similar opposition because of their regula
tory nature.

One leading authority on labor law stated their

case when he said:
Government agencies are hardly popular when they
control and command; hence government agencies
which control and command are even more rarely
popular, and a new government agency which controls
and commands in situations so surcharged with emo
tion as have been those committed to the National
Labor Relations Board would be a latter-day miracle
if it were popular with all whom its operations
affect.
The National Labor Relations Board was
not such a miracle.23
Another reason for the unpopularity of the act was its
alleged one-sidedness.

It provided for unfair labor practices

committed by employers without also providing for employee
unfair labor practices.

Walter Harnischfeger, testifying for

^ H u n t v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 583 (1854).
23
6 Ludwig Teller, Labor Pisputes and Collective Bargain
ing (New York: Baker, Voorhis and Company, IncT," 194 o ) , V . II,
p. 695.

the National Association of Manufacturers, said that the
unfair labor practices were 11... arbitrary, ill-advised, and
utterly lacking in mutuality... and should, if unfair, be
prohibited for labor as well as for business.”

24

Pointing out that the compulsions of the bill could
run against management, attorney Walter Gordon Merritt, appear
ing for the League of Industrial Rights, argued strenuously
that if management was going to be required to bargain with
the elected representative of its employees, the least the
government could do was to require certain minimum standards
of the union.

Merritt cited various cases from his New York

experience to prove that unions ” ... like all other human
institutions,” engage in wrong doings and that it would be
wrong to force companies to bargain with such unions.

By way

of ”extreme illustration,” he pointed out the possibility that
a company might have to bargain with a Communistic organiza
tion, and although he observed this was an ”absurd” example,
he used it to make the point that the bill should have some
provisions to protect the employer from this kind of situation.
A first step in understanding the reasoning of the
’’one-sidedness” argument comes with the recognition that

rlearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee
on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 74th Congress ,
1st Session, p. 238.
2 3 I b i d .,

pp. 309-34.
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one-sided legislation was not new in American history.

A

classic example of this type of legislation was the tariff.
The bitter battles which an Agricultural South and an Indus
trial North fought over this issue in our early history are
legendary.

Moreover, the argument that infant industry encour

aged and protected by the tariff, should be asked to abide by
certain standards of working conditions or wages were not even
considered.

There were other examples of legislation which

were beneficial to one group at the expense of another.

The

explanation as to why this occurs is that in every case
legislators have had objectives which they were trying to
achieve.

Balanced legislation may appear to be more fair, but

it may at the same time be less effective in achieving the
desired objective.
Basic to an understanding of the one-sidednesS of the
Hagner Act lies in the conclusion by its backers that a more
balanced approach would fail to achieve their objective.

This

showed up quite clearly in the debates on the Tydings Amend
ment when the bill was finally up for passage.

Section 7 of

the bill read:
Employees shall have the right to self
organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations to bargain collectively through
the representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in concerted activities, for the pur
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection.26

^^United States Statutes at Large, 74th Congress,
Session 1, July 16, 1935.
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Senator Tydings proposed that the phrase nfree from
coercion or intimidation from any source” be added to this
07

sectionv

In support of his amendment he argued that if employ

ees were given the right to organize they ought to be free from
interference not only by the employer but from any source.
This amendment was, of course, aimed at the organizational
activities engaged in by the American Federation of Labor.
This argument had a strong appeal to many senators who did
not fully understand the implication of such an amendment.
The sponsors of the bill resisted the amendment successfully
with the argument that it was exactly what industry opponents
of the bill wished.

Senator Wagner reasoned that the courts

could not be 'trusted to interpret the word ^coercion11-when
applied to labor organizations.

He said:

But how has the word ’’coercion" as among
employees been interpreted by the.courts? The
use of pickets, mere persuasion without any
force, threats, or intimidation, has been deemed
coercion; and employees simply trying to persuade
their fellow workers to join a particular organi
zation have been charged with c o e r c i o n . 28
The fear that the Tydings amendment would destroy the
purpose of the bill drove the proponents of the bill on to
overcome the efforts to amend it.

Huey Long expressed this

view during the debate when he said:

97

Congressional Record, 74th Congress, Vol. 79, Part 7,
p. 7650.
28 Ibid.,

p. 7654.
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The Senator Tydings
knows that we have been
trying to get laborers the right to organize for
quite a while, and we never have been able to
draft a law yet which has not been whittled down.
By interpretation, the laws have always been cut
down. Does not the Senator think we can take a
chance for once in our lives for a little while?
If the Senator from New York can draft an act
that will protect labor, he will be the only man
who has ever been able to do it. Nobody else
has ever been able to do it with the court inter
pretations.
X do not believe we ought to whittle
away the bill and not take a chance.29
Backers of the bill also argued that the contention
the bill was unfair because it was one-sided regarding the
unfair labor practices was invalid because the Common Law and
Statutory Law of the several states and Federal government
were then adequate to deal with unlawful activities carried
on by labor.

It was further argued that the establishment

of employee unfair labor practices would impede the enforce
ment machinery set up by the act.

The Committee report which

accompanied the National Labor Relations bill upon its refer
ence to the United States Senate answered the argument in this
way:
The only result of introducing proposals of this
sort into the bill, in the opinion of the committee,
would be to overwhelm the Board in every case with
counter-charges and recriminations that would pre
vent it from doing the task that needs to be done.
There is hardly a labor controversy in which during
the heat of excitement statements are not made on
both sides which, in the hands of hostile or unsym
pathetic courts , might be construed to come under

2 9 Ibi d . ,

p. 7655
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the common-law definition of fraud, which in some
states extends even to misstatements innocently
made, but without reasonable investigation. And
if the Board should decide to dismiss such charges,
its order of dismissal would be subject to review
in the Federal Coiirts. Proposals such as these
under discussion are not new.
They were suggested
when Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act was up for discussion, and when the
1934 Amendments to the Railway Labor Act were
before Congress.
In neither instance did they
command the support of Congress .5 0
The Committee report was very specific in answering
the argument put forth by various employer groups that if the
employer could not influence or coerce the employees in their
organization activities or the choice of their representatives
then the same thing should be forbidden to employees or labor
organizations.

The Committee's answer to this w a s :

The corresponding right of employers is that
they should be free to organize without the inter
ference on the part of the employees; no showing
has been made that this right of employers to
organize needs federal protection as against
employees.
It should be understood, however, that employers did not ask
for protection to organize themselves.

They wanted to prevent

the unions from interfering with their employees.
tee continued by saying:

The Commit

,fTo say that employees and labor

organizations should be no more active than employers in the

Hearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee
on Education and Labor, Report to Accompany Bill, United States
Senate, 74th Congress, 1st Session, p. 15.
5 1 I bid..

p. 17.
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organization of employees is untenable; this would defeat the
'■ . :
. ■ 32
very objects of the bill.,r
Somewhere in the testimony of almost every industry
representative during the course of the hearings on the pro
posed law was the thesis that a major defect of the bill was
its premise that the relationship between employer and employee
was one of conflict rather than cooperation.

This view was

directly related to the fact that the existing company unions
would largely be abolished and industry was not ready to admit
that these unions were largely company dominated, or that out
side unions could come in without disrupting the whole econ
omy.

To the industrialist, a strong national union movement

was something to be feared.

This point of view was aptly

stated in a resolution passed by the Cleveland, Ohio, Chamber
of Commerce, which read in part:
The friendly and cooperative relationship exist
ing between thousands of employers and their employ
ees - existing to so large an extent that such
relationships are the rule and not the exception should not be subj’ected to demoralization by pro
fessional labor agitators whose primary obj'ective
is to foment antagonism, with a view to an organ
ized power, socially, politically, and economi
cally dangerous to the American C o m m o n w e a l t h . ^

5 2 lbid.,

33

p. 17.

.
.
Hearings on a National Labor Board, Committee on
Education and Labor, United States Senate, 73rd Congress,
2nd Session, Part 1, p. 633.
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Some employers were much more moderate in their
opinion.

Henry Dennison of the Dennison Manufacturing Compa n y ,

who had served as an industry member of the National Labor
Board, was such an employer.

While conceding that many inde

pendent unions were in fact company dominated, Mr. Dennison
said:
But my firm conviction is that under today's
conditions, this evil will be short-lived,
whereas the evils' of forcing the growth of out
side unions beyond the rate at which capable
leaders can be discovered and can gain experi
ence will last a generation.
In few, if any,
plans can a hog-tied company union survive more
than a year or two; they will either evolve
into true and independent employee representa
tion or blow up and reform into stiff and often
antagonistic unions controlled from without.
But a sufficient number of new unions unski11fully lead - and union membership is one of the
most highly skilled of the arts - will lead to
enough fool trouble, bitter strife, and blood
shed to set the whole country blindly against
unionism. ^4
If industry saw dangers in the proposed legislation,
the Communist oriented trade union Unity League did not.

Its

spokesman, William F. Dunne, said:
W e are against this bill just as we were against
7 (a), and for practically the same reasons because it is intended to be used as another willo-the-wisp to dance before the eyes of the working
class while the employers and official labor
leaders in the National Recovery Act machinery,
thinking of "national recovery" in terms of "all
the people," which means the capitalist class,
which means mainly the big employers, trick them
further into the swamp of starvation wages and
permanent mass unemployment
3 4 I b i d .,

p. 403

3 3 I b i d ■,

pp. 990-91.

83
Summarizing objections to the act based on the nclass
conflicts argument, Congressman Eaton stated during debate:
This and all similar legislation rests upon the
absurd proposition that all business men are dis
honest and unfair, and all employees are incapable
of self-determination or self-government.
It
places the relation of employer and employee upon
a permanent and unalterable war basis.
It rests
upon the false assumption that the interests of
employer and employee are by their intrinsic
nature absolutely irreconcilable....- It puts the
employer in a criminal class, subject to fine and
imprisonment for a list of new crimes fastened
upon him under legal processes as unjust and
unfair as they certainly will turn out to be uncon
stitutional.
Those who were favorably disposed to the legislation
answered the "class conflict *1 argument by reasoning that a
free independent union would put employees and employers on
an equal footing, thereby promoting mutual respect.
said

They also

that a national union was an economic necessity in modern

circumstances.

Senator Wagner said:

Under modern industrial conditions problems of
wages and hours are regional or even national in
scope. More important, only representatives who
are not subservient to the employer with whom they
deal can act freely in the interest of the workers.
Simple common sense tells us that a man does not
possess this freedom when he bargains with those who
control his source of livelihood... collective bar
gaining becomes a mockery when the spokesman of the
employees is the marionette of the employer . ^

^ C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record, Vol 79, Part 9, pp. 9681-2.
5 7 I b i d ..

Part 7, pp. 7569-70.
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The generality of some of the sections contained in
the bill were also a source of hostility*

In Section 8 (1)

there was reference to "interference, restraint, and coer
cion" without giving any definition of the precise meaning
of these terms.

The Board later gave the words the widest

interpretation including within the ban of that section what
it called "subtle forms of c o e r c i o n . " ^

This, of course, was

exactly what the opponents of the bill feared.

Again, the

Board was given no guide lines in connection with the selec
tion of an appropriate bargaining unit under Section 9 (b)
of the bill by which to determine that unit.

In the eyes of

the enemies of the bill, this gave the Board too much arbi
trary power, allowing a Board unfriendly to industry to choose
an undesirable unit.
Probably the most argumentative section of the bill
was Section 8 (5>.

This section imposed upon the employer the

duty to bargain in good faith collectively with the representa
tives of his employees.

Because these terms were not properly

defined and appeared to be ambiguous, it caused uncertainty
and, consequently, animosity among those who were required to
conform to the Act.
Another source of antagonism to the bill was Section
2 (3> which stated that "a striking employee" should not lose

"■^Harrisburg Childress Dress Company, 2 N.. L. R. B. 1058,
(1937).
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his status as an employee because of engaging in a strike.
Although labor unions had been hoping for such a status for
years, the law up to this time gave little support to this
contention.

A strike was generally held to terminate the
39

employment relationship.

Under Section 2 (3) of the

National Labor Relations Act, on the other hand, the term
^employee" was defined so as to include "any individual whose
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and sub
stantially equivalent .■'employment,..

As a result, the employer

was obliged by the act to reinstate without discrimination
striking employees and, where the strike was the result of an
unfair labor practice, to discharge employees hired to replace
the strikers and to reinstate the strikers upon termination of
the s t r i k e . ^

One who was obligated to bargain in good faith

with those who impaired his business, or who was under obliga
tion to reinstate striking employees, could not be expected
to be friendly to legislation which imposed such obligations.
Some of the major objections to the act were on consti
tutional grounds.

In spite of the fact that the Supreme Court

39

Teller, o p . c i t ., Vol. 1, pp. 238-9.
^ N a t i o n a l Labor Relations Board v. MacKay Radio and
elegraph C o m p a n y , 304 U.~~S . 333 (1938) .

subsequently found the act to be clearly constitutional, it
41
is important to examine the objections.
main objections:

There were seven

First, it was argued the act was lacking in

due process of law because it failed to accord proper proce
dural safeguards against arbitrary administrative power and it
compelled the employer to bargain against his will.

It also

forced reinstatement of striking employees without discrimina
ting against those more actively engaged in strikes or other
union activities.

Secondly, it was asserted the act involved

undue delegation of legislative power; that is to say, Congress
gave too much discretionary and interpretive power to the
National Labor Relations Board, and by so doing was delegating
legislative power.
The third objection was that the act was an invasion
of the power reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution.

However the Senate Committee on

Labor and Education felt they had the authority to protect
full freedom of organization and to prevent employer domina
tion of

employee organizations because they

promote

industrial peace which in turn promoted the free flow

of commerce among the several states.

were trying to

They justified their

claim by citing a case involving the Railway Labor Act of 1926.

Ludwig T e l l e r , Labor
ing; (New York: Baker, Voorhis
p. 699.

Disputes and Collective Bargain
and Company, I n c ., 1940), Vol.II,
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The case involved a railroad brotherhood which brought suit
i
to restrain the company from interfering with the rights of
the employees to self-organization and designation of repre
sentatives in violation of the Railway Labor Act of 1926.

The

Supreme Court compelled the company to;. (1) completely dises
tablish its company union, (2) reinstate the Brotherhood,
which was the recognized representative chosen by the majority
of employees before the company began its interference, (3)
restore to service and to certain privileges employees who
have been discharged for activities on behalf of the Brother
hood.^
The fact that jurisdictional strikes or any strikes
burdened the flow of interstate commerce had been recognized
/ TZ
by the courts in several well-known cases.
Chief Justice
Taft said in the Coronado case, nXf Congress deems certain
recurring practices, though not really part of interstate com
merce, likely to obstruct, restrain, or burden it, it has the
power to subject them to national supervision or restraint

42

Texas and New Orleans Railroad v. Brotherhood 281,
U. S. 548 TI929}.
~ ~
43

.
Duplex Printing Press Company v. Peering, 254 U. S.
443 (1921). American Steel Poundarles v. Tri-City Central Trades
Cou n c i l , 257 U. S. 184 (1922Y. CoroTiado Coal Company v. United
Mine W o r k e r s , 268 U. S. 295 (1925). Bedford Cut Stone Company
v. Stone Cutters Association, 274 U.
37 (1927) .
^ U n i t e d Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Company, 259 U. S.
--- --- -- ~
344 (1922)“
“
~~
-
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This idea was also found m

several other cases.

45

The fourth objection was that the act interfered with
the right of jury trial in violation of the Seventh Amendment
to the Federal Constitution,

insofar as it permitted the award

of back pay by an administrative agency. •
The fifth and sixth objections were that the act inter
fered with the freedom of the press and freedom of speech, both
violations of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The seventh and last objection was the broad defini
tion given to the words "labor dispute."

This rendered the act

unconstitutional even assuming the act to be a valid congres
sional power in interstate commerce.

All of the above objec

tions were made several times by lawyers representing the
various employer g r o u p s . ^
Even before the passage of the act on September 5,
1935, the National Lawyers 7 Committee of the American Liberty
League, an employer organization, declared the law unconstitu/7
tional so far as they were concerned.
In the opinion of the

45 .
Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 322 (1921). United States v.
Ferger, 250 U. S. 199 (1921}. Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen,
262 U. S. 1 (1923).
-- ------------- -------- --------46t
Hearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee
on Education and Labo r ~ United States Senate, 74th Congress,
1st Session, Part 2, pp. 238-349.
47

National Labor Relations Board, First Annual Report,
1936, p. 46.
~------ ~~----“■
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Board, this did much to undermine the effectiveness of the law
in its early days.

The Board Stated:

During its first months, and before the Board
had opportunity even to announce its procedures,
an incident occurred which was to simulate injunc
tion suits against the Board, and evfen to provide
a sample brief for those wishing to attack the act.
This was the publication by the National Lawyers’
Committee of the American Liberty League, on Sept
ember 5, 1935, of a printed assault on the consti
tutionality of the act.
This document, widely
publicized and distributed throughout the country
immediately upon its issuance, did not present the
argument in an impartial manner for the use of the
attorneys.
It was not a review of the cases which
might be urged for and against the statute.
It was
not a brief in any case in court nor was it an
opinion for any client involved in any case pending.
Under the circumstances it can be regarded only as
a deliberate and concentrated effort by a large
group of well-known lawyers to undermine public
confidence in the statute, to discourage compliance
with it, to assist attorneys generally in attacks
,
on the statute, and perhaps to influence the courts.
The National Labor Relations Act was drafted to apply
only to disputes concerning industries which affected inter
state commerce.

This was done for the obvious reason that

Congress had jurisdiction only in this area and would not have
any jurisdiction involving intrastate commerce.

Section 2 ( 6 )

provided the following definition of the term "commerce:”
The term ’’commerce” means trade, traffic,
commerce, transportation, or communication among
the several States, or between the District of
Columbia or any territory of the United States and
any state or other territory, or between any foreign
country and any State, Territory, or the District
48

.
Ibid., p. 47.
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of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia
or any Territory, or between points in the same
State but through any other State or any Terri
tory or the District of Columbia or any foreign
country.49
Section 2 (7) of the act defines "affecting commerce 11
as follows:
The term "affecting commerce" means, in commerce,
or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free
flow of commerce, or having led or tending to
lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce.50
It can be seen by the above provisions that the act
contains no precise definition of the scope of interstate com
merce.

This was later recognized by the Supreme Court in

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laugh!in Steel
Corporation where the Court said;
Whether or not a particular activity does affect
commerce in such a close and intimate fashion as
to be subject to Federal control, and hence to lie
within the authority conferred upon the Board, is
left by the statute to be determined as individual
cases arise.bi
section 2 (1 ) provides that the term "person" includes
one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corpora
tions , legal representatives, trustees in bankruptcy, or

49

United States Statutes at L a r g e , 74th Congress,
Section 1, July 16, 1935.
50.r, . ,
Ibid.
51

.
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin
Steel Corporation, 301 U. S. 1 (1937X7
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receivers."

Section 2 (2) provides that "the term 'employer 1

includes any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States
or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person
subject to the Railway Act, as amended from time to time, or
any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer)
or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such
labor organization."

52

It is significant to note that Congress

included the word "association" in its definition of the term
"person."

The Board has held subsequently that an employer

also includes employers 1 associations when the associations
have authority over the labor policies and problems of the
member emplo yers.^
Section 2 (3) of the act provides that the term
"employee" includes any employee, that is, not limited to the
employees of a particular employer.

The report of the Senate

Committee on Education and Labor set forth its reason for
refusing to limit the term "employee" to the employees of a
particular employer, as follows:
Under modern conditions employees at times
organize along craft or industrial lines and fo;
labor organizations that extend beyond the limi

52

United States Statutes at L a r g e , 74th Congress,
Session 1, July 16, 1935.
■^Williams Coal Comoany, 11 N. L. R. B. 579 (1939).

of a single employer unit.
These organizations
at times make agreements or bargain collectively
with employers or with an association of employ
ers.
Through such business dealings, employees
are at times brought into an economic relation
ship with employers who are not their employers.54
The definition did not include any individual employed
55

"

as a farm laborer or as a domestic servant of any family.
It is important to remember that striking employees retained
their status as employees under the act in two situations:
first, where they struck in connection with a ’’current" labor
dispute**; secondly, where the strike was the result of an
unfair labor practice.
Section 2 (4) of the act provided that the term ’’repre• P C

sentative,r included any individual or labor organization.-^
In other words, the representative did not have to be an
employee.

A n outside union might be chosen.

The National Labor Relations Act was passed and signed
by President Roosevelt on July 5, 1935.

It was called the

t*Wagner-Gonnery Act** or more commonly, the ’V a g n e r Act.”^^

^^Hearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee
on Education and Labor, Report to Accompany Bill, United States
Senate, 74th Congress, 1st Session, p. 302.
55

.
United States Statutes at L a r g e , 74th Congress,
Session 1, July 16, 1935.
~^ I b i d . .

57
J The American L a b o r ,Legislation Review, Vol. 25,
December, 1935, p. 33.
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President-Roosevelt's message on signing the bill echoed the
hopes for all who worked for its passage.

He said:

•..this Act defines, as a part of our substantive
law, the right of self-organization of employees
in industry for the purpose of collective bargain
ing, and provides methods by which the Government
can safeguard that legal right.
It establishes
a National Labor Relations Board to hear and deter
mine cases in which it is charged that this legal
right is abridged or denied, and to hold fair
elections to ascertain who are the chosen repre
sentatives of employees. A better relationship
between labor and management is the high purpose
of this Act.
By assuring the employees the right
of collective bargaining, it fosters the development of employment control on a sound and equitable
basis.
By providing an orderly procedure*for deter
mining who is entitled to represent the employees,
it aims to remove one of the chief causes of waste
ful economic strife.
By preventing practices which
tend to destroy the independence of labor, it seeks,
for every worker within its scope, that freedom of
choice and action which is justly his.58.

CO
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt
(New York: Random House, 1938), Vol. IV, pp. 294-5.

CHAPTER IV
THE WAGNER ACT IN THE COURTS
The belief that the National Labor Relations Act was
unconstitutional did much to discourage adherence to the law.
Advised by their lawyers that the Supreme Court would most
certainly invalidate it as going beyond the powers of Congress
over interstate commerce, on which its provisions were based,
anti-union employers did not hesitate to violate the law and
instituted scores of injunctions to prevent the National Labor
Relations Board from enforcing it.
The constitutionality of the Wagner Act was still
undetermined as a new wave of unrest rose in the industrial
world.

By 1937, strikes rose to a peak even higher than

that of 1934.

They totaled 4,720 and almost two million work

ers were involved.

Auto workers at General Motors organized

a dramatic sit-down strike.^
Court finally acted.

On April 12, 1937, the Supreme

In a series of decisions, of which the

most important was that rendered in the case of National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Company, the law
was sustained.

2

In this case, Chief Justice Hughes stated in

^Foster Rhea D u l l e s , Labor in America (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1949), p. 279.
2

National Labor Relations Board v . Jones and Laughlin
Steel C o m p a n y , 301 U . S . 1 (1937).
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the five-to-four decision, ’’Employees have as clear a right
to organize and select their representatives for lawful pur
poses as the respondent has to organize its business and
select its own officers and agents.”

3

In the fight to prevent passage of the Wagner Act, the
4
opposition listed seven constitutional objections.

In due

time, each objection was tested by the Supreme Court.
One of the leading arguments involved the question of
whether the act failed to provide for safeguard against arbi
trary administrative procedure and w a s , therefore, in viola
tion of ’’due process of law.”

This question was settled when

the Supreme Court, in the Jones and Laughlin Steel Company case,
said:
There must be complaint, notice, and hearing.
The Board must receive evidence and make findings.
The findings as to the facts are to be conclusive,
but only if supported by evidence.
The order of
the Board is subject to review by the designated
court. All questions of constitutional right or
statutory authority are open to examination by the
court. We construe the procedural provisions as
affording adequate opportunity to secure judicial
protection against arbitrary action in accordance
with the well settled rules applicable to admini
strative agencies set up by Congress to aid in the
enforcement of valid legislation .^1

3 Ibid.

4
See Chapter III, pages 8 6 - 8 8 .
5
.
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin
Steel Company, 301 U. S . 1 (1937) .
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The argument that the act violated the due process
clause by directing an employer to bargain with his employees
against his will was also found lacking*

The Court said:

The Act does not compel agreements between
employers and employees.
Xt does not compel any
agreement whatsoever.
It does not prevent the
employer from refusing to make a collective con
tract and hiring individuals on whatever terms
the employer may by unilateral action determine.°
The Court in the same decision also overturned the argu
ment that due process of law was ignored by the act because it
arbitrarily interfered with the employer*s right to hire and
fire.

The Court said:
The Act does not interfere with the normal
exercise of the right of the employer to select
its employees or to discharge them.
The employer
may not under cover of that right intimidate or
coerce its employees with respect to their selforganization and representation, and, on the
other hand, the Board is not entitled to make its
authority a pretext for interference with the right
of discharge when that right is exercised for other
reasons than such intimidation and coercion .'7
The contention that the act involved undue delegation

of legislative power was answered by the Court in the Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corporation case simply with the words:

'"The
o
Act establishes standards to which the Board must conform." ■
The Court did not explain the nature of the standards which
the act establishes, but it is clear from a reading of the act
that the Board is given no discretion in determining the

6Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.
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existence or non-existence of wrongs other than those set
down in the act.

Specifically the jurisdiction of the Board

is limited to the prevention of the unfair labor practices
listed in the act, and to the certification of representation
for the purpose of collective bargaining.
The Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution pro
vides that ffin suits of common law, where the value and contro
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved.”

Section 10 (c) of the act gives to the

Board the power to order reinstatement of an employee and also
the power to direct the employer to pay the wages for the
unemployment caused by wrongful discharge.

In the case of

Jones, and Laughlin Steel Corporation, the plaintiff claimed
this was unconstitutional because it deprived the employer the
right to trial by. jury.

The Court answered the contention in

a twofold fashion: F i rst, it was pointed out that the Seventh
Amendment did not apply to cases arising out of proceedings
unknown to common law.

Secondly, it was stated that ”the

amendment is inapplicable to a case where recovery of money
damages is an incident to equitable relief... either analogy
could suffice to take Section 10 (c) of the Act out of the
9
vice of the Seventh Amendment.”
The Tenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
reserves all powers not specifically granted to the Federal

9 Ibid.

Government to the States.

The contention was raised in the

Jones and Laughlin case that the entire act was Invalid becaus
it invaded the Sta t e s ’ right to regulate local industry.

The

Court, however, pointed to Sections 2 (6) and 2 (7) of the act
the first of which defined 11commerce" and the second of which
defined "affecting commerce."

The jurisdiction of the act is

limited to the prevention of unfair labor practices affecting
interstate commerce, and congressional jurisdiction over inter
state commerce was an unquestioned constitutional Federal
power.

It was also pointed out that if the Board involved

itself in a dispute not affecting interstate commerce, the
industry had remedy in the c our t s .^
It had been argued by the opponents of the bill that
a firm engaged In simple manufacture was not engaged in inter
state commerce even if it bought its materials from firms in
other states and consequently sold Its finished product in
other states.

In a discussion of the Jones and Laughlin case,

Professor Magruder pointed out that the company was organized
on a broad and national scale; it was impossible for the Court
11
not to consider it involved in interstate commerce.

10

Ibid.

^ C a l v e r t Magruder, "A Half Century of Legal Influence
Upon the Development of Collective Barga.ining," Harvard Law
Review, Vol. go, (1936-7), p. 1092.
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The Court observed
When industries organize themselves on a
national scale, making their relation to inter
state commerce the dominant factor in their acti
vities, how can it be maintained that their indus
trial labor relations constitute a forbidden
field into which Congress may not enter when it
is necessary to protect interstate commerce from
the paralyzing consequences of industrial war? 2
This interpretation would lead one to believe that all
business engaged in, that is, any type of buying or selling
across state lines was subject to regulation.
the case.

This was not

It is a matter of Court judgment as to whether the

case involves a serious effect on interstate commerce.

Pro

fessor Magruder explains:
... the mere fact that a small concern obtains
most of its raw materials from extrastate sources
and sells most of its products to extrastate
customers might not be enough, as in the case of a
little factory manufacturing some unique but insig
nificant gadget. A strike in such a factory might
not be regarded as of ’’such urgent national concernn
as to justify the application of Federal regulation,
to production and activity intrastate in character
w h e n separately considered.3-3
In the case of Jones and Laughlin Steel Company, a
somewhat hazy point of law was raised.
follows:

The argument ran as

The plaintiff conceded Congress' right to regulate

interstate commerce when Congress attempted to remove actual

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughl:
Steel C ompany, 301 U. S. 1 (1937) .
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obstruction to the channels of interstate commerce.

But the

use of Congressional power over interstate commerce as a means
of regulating labor relations constituted the employment of
a legitimate Congressional power for the purpose of exercising
another power not belonging to Congress.

In this case, the

Court briefly stated that the act dealt with interstate com
merce and was a legitimate power of C o n g r e s s . ^

In a later

case, the Court made itself clear on this point when it said:
If industrial strife due to unfair labor prac
tices actually brought about such a catastrophy,
we suppose that no one would question the author
ity of the Federal government to intervene in order
to facilitate the settlement of the dispute and the
resumption of the essential service to interstate
and foreign commerce.
But it cannot be maintained
that the exertion of federal power must await the
disruption of that commerce.
Congress was entitled
to provide reasonable preventive measures, and that
was the object of the National Labor Relations A c t . ^
The question as to whether or not the act violated the
First Amendment regarding freedom of the press was brought up
in the case of the Associated Press v. National Labor Relations
Board.

In this case, the Associated Press fired one of its

rewrite men for union activity.

The contention of the

14

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin
Steel C o m p a n y , 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
15

Consolidated Edison Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197 (1938). '
16
Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board,
301 U. S. 103 C1937).
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Associated Press was that the National Labor Relations Board
had no jurisdiction in the case because they had the protec
tion of the First Amendment.

The Court exploded the exaggera

ted notion which the Press had on this point by saying:

"The

publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the
17
application of general laws .11

The Court felt that the

guarantee of freedom of the press has to do with liberty of
the publisher "to publish the news as it desires it published
or to enforce policies of its own choosing with respect to
the editing and rewriting of news for publication."
fessor Magruder said of this case:

18

As Pro

"The Constitution of the

United States has not guaranteed to publishers the right to
discharge an employee, even an editorial employee, because he
has joined or been active in a labor organization."

19

By 1938, a new contention was raised for the first
time.

Because the act obligated the employer to reinstate

striking employees without discriminating against them, it was
in violation of the due process of law clause where such obligation was sought to be fastened upon an employer guilty of
no unfair labor practice prior to the calling of the strike
The Court held in the case of National Labor Relations
Board v. MacKay Radio and Telegraph Company that the guarantee
18

Ibid

p. 1100-01
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of due process was not violated, since under the act striking
employees retain their status as employees in the case where
the strike is called as a result of an unfair labor practice
by an employer, and also in the case where the strike is con
nected with a current labor dispute, even though not cau s e d ’
by any unfair labor practice by the employer.
The respondent insists... that the relation of
employer and employee ceased at the inception of
the strike.
The plain meaning of the Act is that
if m e n strike in connection with a current labor
dispute, their action is not to be construed as a
renunciation of the employment relation and they
remain employees for the remedial purposes speci
fied in the Act. We have held that, in the exer
cise of the commerce power, Congress may impose
upon contractual relationships reasonable regula
tions calculated to protect commerce against
threatened industrial strife .2 0
The Board’s order, therefore, was sustained and required the
reinsbailment of the discharged employees.
The last constitutional question was whether the act
was unconstitutional because it interfered with the employer’s
right to state his views on the subject of unions; hence a
violation of the First Amendment guaranteeing freedom of
speech.

No challenge has been made that the act itself was

unconstitutional for this reason.

The question has been raised

as to whether the Board *s interpretation was constitutional.
In at least one case the B o a r d ’s interpretation was overruled

20

National Labor Relations Board v. MacKay Radio and
Telegraph Company, 304 U . S . 333 T l 9 38).

on this ground by the Circuit Court of Appeals.

op

The fact

that the act was found constitutionally acceptable in almost
every way is apparent upon the close examination of the
Supreme C o u r t Ts opinion in the Jones and Laughlin Steel Com
pany case.

Professor Ludwig Teller said the act ’’was held

constitutional outstandingly in the case of National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation...n

22

21

National Labor Relations Board v . MacKay Radio and
Telegraph Company, 304 U. S. 333 (1938).
22

.

.

Ludwig Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargain
ing (New York: Baker Voorhis and Company, I n c . , 1940), Vol. II
p. 699.

CHAPTER V
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING - A FACT
In order to appreciate the accomplishments and the
constantly expanding scope of the National Labor Relations Act,
it is necessary to examine some of the more important interpre
tations of the act, made by the National Labor Relations Board
in its daily application of the law.

Section 8 declared the

following to be unfair labor practices:

(1) To interfere w i t h ,

restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7; ( 2 ) To dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it...; (3> By discrimi
nation in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member
ship in any labor organization....^
The first paragraph of Section 8 , which prohibits any
restraint, coercion, or interference with the right of selforganization, was broad enough to embrace all other paragraphs
of the section.

A n employer could not do anything to hinder

or interfere with the right of his employees to organize.
Neither he nor his agents could use violence against union

•^United States Statutes at Lar g e , 74th Congress,
Session 1, July 16, 1935.

members.

This was most clearly established in a 1939

before the National Labor Relations Board.

2

An employer could not employ spies to
3
on union activities.
It was also determined

report to
that a threat

by an employer to shut down a plant or to move it to

■another ■
.

location in order to discourage organizational activities
a violation of Section 8 (1).^
The Board has held that in some instances the e m p l o y e r
must permit union agents to enter upon his property in order
to contact his employees, and he could not prohibit union
solicitation upon his property outside of working hours.

5'

A

wage Increase given by an employer to his employees was con
sidered to be an unfair labor practice if there was any evi
dence to indicate that his purpose might have been to discour
age organizational activities.6
It was established that an employer was not permitted
to engage in bribery to influence
toward

the attitude of his employees

a union or to coerce union officials.

For

^Dow Chemical Company, 13

N. L. R. B. 993

^Agurlines, I n c ., 2 N. L.

R. B. 1 (1936).

example, it

(1939).

^Triplett Electrical Instrument Company, 5 N. L. R. B.
635 (1938).
^Seas Shipping Company, 4 N* L. R. B . 757 (1938).
^Indianapolis Power and Light Company, 25 N. L. R. B.
163(194077
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was found to be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
offer vacations with pay to employees who promised that in a
representational election they would vote against any outside
union.

Another employer was found to have violated the law

by offering a union representative a good position ” ... at a
high salary provided he would desert the union.”

8

Section 8 (1) of the act, as it was applied by the
Board, actually tended to limit the employer from making any
comments about a union.

Hence the employer claimed his free

dom of speech was infringed upon.

However it was limited only

to the extent that he could not use this freedom to coerce his
9

employees regarding union activities.

The Board has said

that the effect of an employer’s statements concerning a union
is to be determined ” ... by an evaluation of the natural conse'
quences of such statements made not by one equal to another,
but by an employer to those dependent upon it for their con
tinued employment and livelihood. ,t^°

The type of language

used also had a bearing on whether or not the employer was in
violation of the act.

For example, the employer could not use

^McNeely and Price Company, 6 N. L. R. B. 800 (1937).
^Carlisle Lumber Company, 2 N. L. R. B. 248 (1936).
9
See Chapter X V , page 102.
^ Y a l e and Towne Manufacturing Company, 17 N. L. R. B.
69 (1939) .“
— ---- —
---- ---
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such phrases as "cut throat" in describing a u n i o n . ^

Further,

an employer was not permitted to tell his employees that the
union could do nothing to improve their conditions of employment.

12

The Board also decided that any statement of employer

preference for one of two rival unions was an act of coer13
cion.
The Board has even held that an admittedly correct
statement about the employeesr rights under the National Labor
Relations Act was a violation of Section 1.

14

The Supreme Court has held that for any statement of
an employer to constitute a violation of the act, coercion
must be evident either in the language used or in some of the
surrounding circumstances.

In the case of the Virginia Elec

tric and Power Company, the employer had posted a bulletin,
stating that it had been free from union organization for
fifteen ye a r s .

It went on to say:

nThe Company recognizes

the right of every employee to join any union that he may wish
to join, and such membership will not affect his position with
the Company."

15

It added that no law required him to join

^ J o n e s and Laughlin Steel C o r p . , 1 N. L. R. B. 503 (1936)
^ Y a l e and Towne Manufacturing Company, 17 N. L. R. B.
69 (1939).
^ C o n t i n e n t a 1 Box C ompany, 19 N. L. R. B. 860 (1940).
^ 4 o c k Gadson Voehbenger Company, 8 N. L. R. B. 133,
136 (1938)7
_
■_ -~ .........
Virginia Electric and Power Company, 20 N. L. R. B.
911, 920 (1940).
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any union.

Concerning this bulletin, the Board said:

,TWe

find that by posting the Bulletin the respondent interfered
with, restrained, and coerced his employees."

But the

Supreme Court held in an opinion written by Justice Murphy
that the employer had the right to express his views on any
side in an industrial controversy provided that no coercion
was involved.

He said:

If the total activities of an employer restrain
or coerce his employees in their free choice, then
those employees are entitled to the protection of
the Act. And in determining whether a course of
conduct amounts to restraint or coercion, pressure
exerted vocally by the employer may no more be dis
regarded than pressure exerted in other w a y s .
Therefore, where the language used is not of itself coercive,
the coercion can be inferred from the surrounding circum
stances, but the Board must make a determination as to whether
or not coercion has been exerted either through utterances
made by the employer or for other reasons.

In the Virginia

Power Company case, the Court found that the utterances were
not of themselves coercive, and since the Board did not relate
them to their background, it found the act had not been vio
lated.

After this decision of the Supreme Court, the Board

re-tried the case.

In its second opinion it found that.the

^Ibid.
17 . . .
Virginia Electric and Power Company v. National Labor
Relations Board, 314 U. S. 469 (l94l).
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Bulletin previously mentioned, when considered along with cer
tain anti-union activities of the Virginia Power Company and
several discriminatory discharges, constituted coercion and
therefore violated the law.
Supreme Court which said:

18

This decision was upheld by the

,,While the Bulletin of April 26 and

the speeches of May 24 are still stressed, they are considered
not in isolation but as a part of a pattern of events adding
up to domination, interference, and c o e r c i o n . ^

Decisions

such as the one discussed above have limited significance,
since the Board is generally able to find the existence of
coercion by considering employer statements in connection with
his other actions.
The second provision of Section 8 prohibits interfer
ence by an employer with the formation and administration of
unions.

The Board has said:

"The formation and administra

tion of labor organizations are the concern of the employees
and not of the employers.n

20

Thus it was designed as a prohi

bition against the establishment of company dominated unions.
The classic case involving the application of this section is
that of the International Harvester Company.

In this instance

•jo
Virginia Electric and Power Company, 44 N. L. R. B.
404 (1942).
^ Virginia Electric and Power Company v. National
Labor Relations B o a r d , 319"U . S . 533, 539 (1943).
Of)

Third Annual Report of the National Labor Relations
Board (1938), p. 125.
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the employer had. established an industrial council plan,
where representatives of the workers selected by members of
the employees 1 association met with representatives of manage
ment to consider conditions of employment.

The program was

initiated by the employer, who financed both the industrial
council and the employees 1 association.

The company urged

all new employees to join the association.

The council could

not make a decision contrary to the wishes of the management.
This organization was, of course, found to be in violation of
the act.

PI
Several years later the Board decided that it was a

violation

of Section 8 (2) for an employee to be discharged

because of his unwillingness to join an unaffiliated union.

22

This was for the obvious reason that a local unaffiliated
union is much easier for an employer to dominate, and by simply
encouraging such a union, in effect is tending to dominate it.
A n employer was forbidden to give any positive assis
tance to a labor organization; he was prohibited from drafting
■

its constitution or from giving it any financial assistance.

21

•

23

International Harvester Company, 2 N. L. R. B. 310,
348 (1936).
22
Titan Metal Manufacturing Company, 5 N. L. R. B.
577, 582 (1938).

23

General Dry Batteries, Inc., 27 N. L. R. B.
102 (1940).

Ill
Thus the employer Is prohibited from paying the wages of an
employee who spends most of his time organizing a union*

24

The obvious reason for this is to prevent the employer from
dominating the actions of the union through influence brought
to bear on the union organizer.
The Board considered it to be immaterial that all the
members of the company dominated union joined it of their own
free will.

Even though all the members joined the union with-

out any form of coercion or bribery, the attempted domination
25
was found to be illegal and the union disestablished.
The
act appears at first glance to prohibit only actual domination
of a union by the employer, but the Board has interpreted this
provision to constitute a prohibition against all attempted
interference with a right to organize.
Section 8 (3) prohibits employers from discouraging or
encouraging union membership by discriminating against union
members.

That i s , an employer in hiring workers and in fixing

the terms and tenure of employment, is forbidden to discrimi
nate against an employee because he is a union member.

A per

son discharged because of union affiliation could be reinstated
by order of the Board with back pay.

Likewise, a refusal to

hire a person because of union membership entitled that person

24Swift and Com p a n y , U N .

L. R. B. 809 (1939).

2~*Hicks Body Comp a n y , 33 N. L. R. B. 858 (1941).
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to a position with a discriminating employer with back pay
from the time of refusal to h i r e .^
The Board has decided that if several union leaders
are the only employees discharged at a given time, an inference could be drawn that the dismissals were discriminatory.

27

The same inference could be made if only employees active in
the formation of a union were discharged at a given time.

28

The Board also decided an employee could not be discharged if
the employer alleged that he dismissed the employee because of
union activity and for other legitimate causes..

If at any

time the employer had given evidence of opposition to unions,
the Board would conclude the dismissal was due to union
activity, even though other good reasons for the discharge
existed, and there was no direct evidence that the action was
taken because of the employee's participation in union acti29
vities.
The Supreme Court later held this practice of the
Board to be i m p r o p e r . ^

If a discriminatory charge was alleged

by the Board, however, and some evidence of union opposition
had been presented, the employer then had the burden of
^°Phelps Dodge Company v. National Labor Relations
Board, 313 U. S. 177 (1941).
”
~
^ A r c a d i a Hosiery Company, 12 N. L. R. B. 467 (1939).
^ R o s s Packing Company, U

N. L. R. B. 934 (1939) .

^ H e a r s t Consolidated Publications, 10 N. L. R. B.
1299; Arcade Sunshine Company, 12 N. L. R. B. 259 (1939).
^
C om pany,

N a tio n a l
306 U. S.

L a b o r R e la tio n s
332 (*1 9 3 9 ).

B o a rd

v.

S a nds M a n u fa c tu r in g
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proving that the discharge was not a consequence of union
activities.

31

Board decisions involving Section 8
difficult for an employer to discipline his
refused to obey orders.

(3) made it quite
workmen who

Employees could not be forced to take

a job formerly held by a union official who had been dis
charged.

This refusal to work was considered to be a union

activity, and to

discharge aworker for refusal to work

such an instance

constituted discrimination

. - .'
32
ees because of their union membership.

in

against the employ-

Employees could not

be discharged for threatening to strike to secure the discharge
of an unpopular foreman.

33

A n employer could be easily injured by inter-union
warfare carried on by workers in his plant.

For example, in a

plant with two conflicting unions it would be a violation of
Section 8 (3) for the employer to discharge members of a union
involved in a jurisdictional strike in order to end the strike,
even if the members of the other union continued to work.5^

^ R e l i a n c e Manufacturing Company v. National Labor
Relations B o a r d , 125 Fed. (2d) 311 (1941).
^ N i l e s Fire Brick Company, 30 N. L. R. B. 426 (1941) .
33

Pittsburgh Standard Envelope Company, 20 N. L. R. B.
516 (1940).
34

National Labor Relations Board v. Star Publishing
Company, 97 Fed. (2df) 465'^1938) .
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The problem of jurisdictional strikes caused by rival union
ism was a very real problem to some employers.

If the act

created a problem for the employer, however, it can be
observed by close study of the National Labor Relations Board
decisions that the act was doing an efficient job of solving
the union problem of employer interference in organizational
attempts by employees.

If any conclusion can be drawn from a

study of the Board decisions, it is that the Board tended to
interpret the act very broadly and became more effective in
enforcing the principles of the act than even the drafters of
the law could have anticipated.
A n indication of the activity of the National Labor
Relations Board can be gained by examination of the following
statistics.

During the period from 1936 to 1947, the Wagner

Act years, the National Labor Relations Board was called upon
to determine representatives for collective bargaining in
36,969 cases.

Labor unions won lawful bargaining rights in

30,110 instances, and workers voted for ”no union” in 6,859
cases.

Slightly more than nine million workers were eligible

to vote in representational elections.

Of this total,

7,677,135 workers, 84 per c e n t , actually cast ballots.

Votes

cast for labor unions amounted to 6,145,834 and votes against
35

unions numbered 1,531,301.

35

These figures indicate the act

Twelfth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations
Board (1947) , p. 125.
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was successful in establishing an orderly manner for the selec
tion of bargaining representatives.
ballot box for industrial warfare.

The law substituted the
Workers in free elections

were given the opportunity of selecting or rejecting the pro
cess of collective bargaining.

The act established the

principle of representative democracy in the nation's indus
trial life.
The number of organizational strikes that took place
following the passage of the act is one standard to evaluate
the results of the National Labor Relations Act.

Approxi

mately fifty per cent of all strikes which occurred during
the 1934-36 period resulted from organizational disputes.
These strikes involved about forty-three per cent of the
workers who engaged in all strikes during this period.

35

In

comparison, in 1942, the first full year of World W a r II,
organizational controversies caused only 31.2 per cent of all
strikes.

In subsequent war years, the organizational strike

was even of less importance.

In 1943 organizational disputes

resulted in 15.7 per cent of all work stoppages; in 1944 they
caused 16.3 per cent of all strikes; and in 1945 organizational
disputes caused 20.5 per cent of all work stoppages.

From the

point of view of the number of workers engaged in strikes
during the war years (1942-1945), work stoppages carried out

^^fonthly Labor Review, Vol. 42, p. 162; and Vol. 44,
p. 1230.
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for organizational purposes involved about 18.5 per cent of
37

all workers engaged in strikes during this period.

In the

light of the organizational strike experience during the
1934-1936 period, it seems likely that in the absence of the
effective operation of the National Labor Relations Act,
organizational strikes would have been of greater comparative
importance during World War II.
A comparison of the frequency of organizational
strikes which took place during World War I with those which
occurred in World War II might further indicate the extent to
which the National Labor Relations Act succeeded in decreas
ing such work stoppages in the World War II years.

During

World War I , when there existed no agency similar to the
National Labor Relations Board, it was reported that 314
strikes were caused by employers’ refusal to recognize unions
in 1917, and 221 such strikes took place in 1918.

Expressed

in a different w a y , recognitional strikes caused approximately
7 per cent of all the strikes in 1917 and about 6.5 per cent
in 1918.

On the other hand, in 1942, the first full year of

World War II, only 169 recognitional strikes occurred and they
accounted for only 5.6 per cent of all 1942 strikes.

38

The success of the act in decreasing the number of
organizational strikes cannot be denied.

3 7 I b id.,

Vol. 56, p. 973.

The trend during

38,.
•,
Ibid..
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World War II removed all doubt on the issue.

Some people,

however, contended that the act, though decreasing the number
of organizational strikes, stimulated strikes for such
non-organizational issues as w a g e s , hours, pensions, vacations,
and the like.

Their argument ran along the following lines.

Under the protection of the National Labor Relations Act,
union membership increased, the union movement expanded into
new a r e a s, and union bargaining strength sharply increased.
These circumstances increased the number of strikes for work
and wage improvements.

Unions became a much more powerful

inf luence in our society and could make more demands, and
strike to achieve these demands.
promote industrial peace.

Hence the act did not

This argument, when closely ana

lyzed, does not prove the act to be defective in any way.

The

act was not intended to do away with all types of strikes.

It

was enacted to reduce the number of organizational strikes and
to encourage the growth of labor organizations for the purpose
of collective bargaining.

This it admittedly did.

It is not

fair to evaluate the National Labor Relations Act on the basis
of the number of overall strikes arising during its operation.
The only valid basis for evaluating its contribution to indus
trial peace is in the area of organizational strikes.
It is quite clear that the National Labor Relations
Act did stimulate the growth of labor uni o n s , which, it must
be remembered, was one of the purposes of the act.

Union
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membership increased from, four million in 1935 to about sixteen million in 1947.

39

Under the protection of the act, the

Congress of Industrial Organizations was able to organize the
mass production industries on an industry-wide basis.

The

American Federation of Labor likewise undertook extensive
organizational activities.

Obviously, the Wagner Act accomp

lished its objectives of promoting collective bargaining.

One

might draw this conclusion from the many objections raised to
the act, and the extreme hostility to the act exhibited by
the enemies of trade unionism.

One may disagree as to whether

or not a large or small union movement is good or bad for
society, the fact remains that during the period of the act
labor unions grew in size and in power.
Other results of the National Labor Relations. Act are
possibly of greater significance.

The act operated to increase

the number of effective collective bargaining agreements.

In

1946 the number of collective bargaining contracts in the
nation totaled well over 50,000.

In addition, during each

year these contracts were re-written and re-signed in whole or
in part.

This was an increase of over 100 per cent in less

than a ten year period.

40

These figures indicate that indus

trial peace and not industrial warfare was the result of the
collective bargaining process.

By far the vast majority of

4 0 Ibid.
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labor contracts were negotiated and signed without resort
to the strike.

Critics who found fault with the act for

having given labor unions the ability to organize themselves
and thereby achieving the economic power to strike in order
to enforce their demands, either must choose to weaken the
union, thereby making it impossible to strike, or must find
some other methods of settling the dispute, such as govern
mental intervention or compulsory arbitration.

This is still

one of the thorny problems of our society.
It is noteworthy that the act stimulated such a great
growth in the number of collective bargaining agreements.
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that these contracts,
once executed, provide the basis for peaceful and industrial
relations for many years.

Perhaps the biggest hurdle to

industrial peace is the negotiation of the first collective
bargaining contract between a particular union and company.
There is some reason to believe that the attitude of
employers towards collective bargaining became more favorable
during the National Labor Relations Act years.

Some employers,

of course, were forced into the collective bargaining process
against their will.

M a n y of them may not have found the

experience as terrible as they might have expected it to be.
Contacts with the unions, their leaders, and their techniques
undoubtedly influenced some employers to change their point
of view on the issue.

In any event, the general attitude
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of employers since the passage of the National Labor Relations
Act have tended to be more broad-minded concerning union acti
vities.

Employers have come to recognize that unions in their

collective bargaining process are here to stay, and that it is
not an evil change, but actually quite a healthy one.

The pre

vailing attitude of the more liberal employer today seems to
be that bargaining between management and labor on an equal
power basis is a desirable method of determining the share
which each element of our society should have of total pro
duction.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The American workingman’s right to organize and bar
gain collectively was disputed for well over a century.

In

the early 19th Century, the courts, both state and federal,
used the old conspiracy doctrine holding that the labor groups
were in restraint of trade.

In mid-century, in the case of

Commonwealth v. H u n t , the use of this doctrine was immediately
halted when a Massachusetts judge decided that a conspiracy
could not be ’’criminal” unless the conspirators were plotting
an illegal act.

Within a few years the use of this doctrine

to discourage union organization all but dis appeared.
Again the courts posed a threat to the union movement.
The courts decided under common law that certain kinds of
contracts and agreements w e r e illegal because they tended to
restrain trade and create a monopoly.

In conjunction with

this concept, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 was used to
discourage union organization and activity.
A n attempt was made in 1914 to exclude labor organi
zations from the anti-trust laws and exempt them from the
court injunction used to prohibit certain union activities.
However, because of conservative court decisions, this attempt
failed.
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The Norris-La Guardia Act, a forerunner of the New
Deal legislation in this field, was the first significant
advance made by labor.

The use of the injunction was limited

and the "yellow dogn contract was made unenforceable.
In an attempt to provide further aid to labor organi
zations , Senator Wagner and his followers passed certain
experimental legislation in the form of the National Indus
trial Recovery Act and Public Resolution Number 44.

This was

thwarted both by the Supreme Court and the general unwilling
ness of the business community to abide by the legislation.
The National Labor Relations Act was the culmination
of the gradual development of a favorable national policy
towards collective bargaining.

Along with the Norris-

La Guardia; Act and Section 7(a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, the law served to encourage the expansion of
the collective bargaining process and industrial unionism.
Whereas the Norris-La Guardia Act prohibited the courts from
taking sides in labor disputes, the National Labor Relations
Act denied employers the opportunity to utilize their superior
economic strength to contain and to destroy unionism.

The

fact that both acts succeeded is evidenced in the remarkable
gains made by organized labor during the 1932-1947 period.
Basically, the standard of evaluation of these two acts rests
upon the merits of the collective bargaining process.

Those
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who feel that a strong labor movement, not a weak one, serves
the public interest will find much to praise in these laws.
Conversely, those who feel a weak, inept movement is in the
interest of society will find much to criticize in these laws.
Suffice to say that these laws had a tremendous influence on
the balance between labor and management, and also, in a more
indirect way, on the general economic structure of the nation.
Labor unions are the collective bargaining agencies.
The process of collective bargaining does not exist apart from
the trade union.

Weakening of the union movement in the

collective bargaining area would diminish the scope and inten
sity of the collective bargaining process.

Both the Norris-

La Guardia Act and the National Labor Relations Act rested
upon the fundamental proposition that legal support was
imperative for the effective operation of trade unionism and
collective bargaining.

The direction of public sentiment has

been one of approval of the collective bargaining process
from the earliest conspiracy case of 1806 to the enactment of
the National Labor Relations Act.

When the courts in early

times frustrated the development and functioning of unionism,
the legislative branch, sensitive to public opinion, took
corrective action.

When the courts again interfered with the

activities of labor by diluting the legislation through inter
pretive methods * the legislatures , again because of public
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sentiment, remedied the situation by legislative action.

The

public, through its legislature, showed its approval of the
collective bargaining process with the passage of the NorrisLa Guardia Act, Section 7 (a), and the National Labor Rela
tions Act.

These laws represented society*s desire to esta

blish a legal framework which would be conducive to the
collective bargaining process.
I n d e e d , the growth of trade unionism and collective
bargaining between the 1932-1946 period, along with the
achievement of respectability by u n i o n s , was nothing short of
being a cataclysmic change.
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APPENDIX

MOHAWK VALLEY FORMULA
First:

When a strike is threatened, label the union leaders
as ’’agitators” to discredit them with the public and
their own followers.
In the plant, conduct a forced
balloting under the direction of foremen in an
attempt to ascertain the strength of the union and
to make possible misrepresentation of the strikes
as a small minority imposing their will upon the
majority.
At the same time, disseminate propaganda
by means of press releases, advertisements, and the
activities of ’’missionaries,” such propaganda
falsely stating the issues involved in the strike
so that the strikers appear to be making arbitrary
demands, and the real issues, such as the employer’s
refusal to bargain collectively, are obscured.
Concurrently with these m o v e s , by exerting economic
pressure through threats to move the plant, align
the influential members of the community into a
cohesive group opposed to the strike.
Include in
this group, usually designated a ’’citizens commit
tee,” representatives of the bankers, real-estate
owners, and business men, i.e., those most sensi
tive to any threat of removal of the plant because
of its effect upon property values and purchasing
power flowing from payrolls.

Second:

W h e n the strike is called, raise high the banner of
’’law and order,” therby causing the community to
mass legal and police weapons against a wholly
imagined violence and to forget that those of its
members who are employees have equal rights with the
other members of the community.

Third:

Call a ’’mass meeting” of the citizens to co-ordinate
public sentiment against the strike and to streng
then th e power of the citizens * committee, which
organization, thus supported, will both aid the
employer in exerting pressure upon the local author
ities and itself sponsor vigilante activities.

Fourth:

Bring about the formation of a large armed police
force to intimidate tie strikers and to exert a
psychological effect upon the citizens. This force
is built up by utilizing local police, state police,
if the governor co-cpznates, vigilantes, and special
deputies, the deputies being chosen if possible from
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other neighborhoods, so that there will be no per
sonal relationships to induce sympathy for the
strikers.
Coach the deputies and vigilantes on
the law of unlawful assembly, inciting to riot,
disorderly conduct, e t c s o that, unhampered by
any thought that the strikers may also possess
some rights, they will be ready and anxious to
use their newly acquired authority to the limit.
Fifth:

And perhaps most important, heighten the demora
lizing effect of the above measures--all designed
to convince the strikers that their cause is hopeless— by a "back-to-work" movement, operated by a
puppet association of so-called "loyal emplo 5?ees"
secretly organized by the employer.
Have this
association wage a publicity campaign in its own
name and co-ordinate such campaign with the work
of the "missionaries" circulating among the strikers
and visiting their h o m e s . This "back-to-work"
movement has these results:
It causes the public
to believe that the strikers are in the minority
and that most of the employees desire to return to
work, thereby winning sympathy for the employer
and an endorsement of his activities to such an
extent that the public is willing to pay the huge
costs, direct or indirect, resulting from the
heavy forces of police.
This "back-to-work" move
ment also enables the employer, when the plant is
later opened, to operate it with strike-breakers
if necessary and to continue to refuse to bargain
c o l l e c t i v e ^ with the strikers.
In addition, the
"back-to-work" movement also enables the employer
to keep a constant check on the strength of the
union through the number of applications received
from, the employees ready to break ranks and return
to work, such number being kept a secret from the
public and the other employees so that the doubts
and fears created by such secrecy will in turn
induce still others to make applications.

Sixth:

W h e n a sufficient number of applications are on hand,
fix a date for an opening of the plant through the
device of having such opening requested by the "backto-work" association.
Together with the citizens *
committee, prepare for such opening by making provi
sion for a peak army of police, by roping off the
areas surrounding the plant, by securing arms and
ammunition, etc.
The purpose of the "opening" of
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the plant is 'three-fold,; to see if enough employees
are ready to return to work; to induce still others
to return as a result of the demoralizing effect
produced by the opening of the plant and the return
of some of their number; and lastly, even if the
maneuver fails to induce a sufficient number of
persons to return, to persuade the public through
pictures and news releases that the opening was
nevertheless successful.
Seventh:

Stage the ’’opening” theatrically, throwing open
the gates at the propitious moment and having the
employees march into the plant grounds in a massed
group protected by squads of armed police so as to
give to the opening a dramatic and exaggerated
quality and thus heighten its demoralizing effect.
Along with the ’’opening” provide a spectacle—
speeches, flag-raising, and praises for the employees,
citizens, and local authorities, so that, their
vanity touched, they will feel responsible for the
continued success of the scheme and will increase
their efforts to induce additional employees to
return to work.

Eighth:

Capitalize on the demoralization of the strikers
by continuing the show of police force and the pres
sure of the citizens* committee, both to insure that
those employees who have returned will continue at
work and to force the remaining strikers to capitu
late.
If necessary, turn the locality into a w a r 
like camp through the declaration of a state of
emergency tantamount to martial law and barricade
it from the outside world so that nothing may inter
fere with the successful conclusion of the ’’formula,”
thereby driving home to the union leaders the f u t i l - .
ity of further efforts to hold their ranks intact.

Ninth:

Close the publicity barrage, which day by day during
the entire period has increased the demoralization
worked by all of these measures, on the theme that
the plant is in full operation and that the strikers
were merely a minority attempting to interfere with
the ’’right to work,” thus inducing the public to
place a moral stamp of approval upon the above m e a 
sures. With this, the campaign is over— the employer
has broken the strike.

